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FROM NUREMBERG TO ROME:
A STEP BACKWARD FOR U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
Henry T. King*
Theodore C. Theofrastous**
Some people are concerned that pursuing peace ... and prose-
cuting war criminals are incompatible goals. But I believe they
are wrong. There must be peace for justice to prevail, but there
must be justice when peace prevails.
- William Jefferson Clinton'
International law is more than a scholarly collection of abstract
and immutable principles... [it is] an outgrowth of treaties and
agreements between nations and of accepted customs ....
[U]nless we are prepared to abandon every principle of growth
in international law we cannot deny that our own day has the
right to institute customs and to conclude agreements that will
themselves become sources of new and strengthened interna-
tional law.
- Justice Robert H. Jackson
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INTRODUCTION
The time was November 21, 1945. The world's attention was fo-
cused on the large courtroom at Nuremberg when Justice Robert H.
Jackson rose to deliver the opening statement for the Prosecution in
the trail blazing trial of the leaders of Nazi Germany for crimes
against the peace of the world and for war crimes. Jackson's unforget-
table words that fateful day ring with meaning. They reflect his de-
termination that the world must end the anarchy that had previously
characterized international relations and that it now enter a new era in
which an international Rule of Law reigned supreme, characterized by
peace and justice. Jackson sought a world in which reason would pre-
vail over force. The world will never forget his statement at Nurem-
berg "that four great nations flushed with victory and stung with in-
jury stay the hand of vengeance and voluntarily submit their captive
enemies to the judgment of the law is one of the most significant trib-
utes that power has ever paid to reason. ,
3
The scope of Jackson's vision extends far beyond Nuremberg. He
knew that, to be lasting and credible, the legal principles established
to try Nazi war criminals must apply to all mankind - not only to the
Nuremberg defendants. Through his actions and convictions, Jackson
set in motion a new era of international law - one where world peace
and security rest firmly upon a binding system of law.
I. CARRYING JACKSON'S TORCH
The wisdom and vision of Justice Jackson's eloquent words reso-
nate today. In the years since the Nuremberg tribunals, the interna-
tional community has embraced the key concepts Jackson and the tri-
bunals stood for: the universal unacceptability of certain crimes and
accountability of both individuals and heads of state for the commis-
sion of such crimes.4 During this same time period, however, the U.S.
acceptance of an international Rule of Law phrased in these terms has
begun to falter. One must wonder what Justice Jackson would have
3 Id. at 99.
4 For this reason, Nuremberg can be seen as the point of inception for the legal
regime of modem human rights. See, e.g., MARK W. JANIs, AN INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW 245-65 (1993).
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thought to see the foreign policy of his own nation questioning the
validity of the path he helped to blaze on its behalf.
Over fifty years later, on July 17, 1998, and after years of prepa-
ration (as well as five final weeks of grueling debate), 120 nations ap-
proved an historic document which presents the world with a realiza-
tion of Justice Jackson's dream: a permanent and independent institu-
tion for maintaining international peace and justice by means of an
international Rule of Law. This document, the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court (the Rome Statute),5 serves as the legal
foundation upon which a new international criminal tribunal will be
formed - one that, like the Nuremberg tribunals, emphasizes indi-
vidual responsibility over state sovereignty.
6
For nearly a decade, the United States has demonstrated a consis-
tent level of executive and congressional interest in the concept of a
permanent International Criminal Court. Surprisingly (or not), the
United States has elected not to join the overwhelming coalition of
states in favor of the formation of this new body.9 Further, not only
did the United States elect not to sign the Rome Statute, but, towards
the end of the treaty conference, it identified ideological and political
differences with the Statute which draw into question the actual U.S.
agenda at Rome.
5 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Jul. 17, 1998, U.N. Doc.
AICONF.183/9, 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998) (adopted by the United Nations Diplomatic
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court) [hereinafter Rome Statute]. See also Final Act of the United Nations Diplo-
matic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. AICONF.183110, (visited Aug. 1, 1998) <http:II
www.un.org/icc/icc.fnact.htm> [hereinafter The Final Act].
6 See generally Henry T. King, Jr., Nuremberg and Sovereignty, 28 CASE W. RES.
J. INTY L. 135, 137 (1996) (arguing that individuals have obligations under interna-
tional law that cannot be avoided by state authorization).
7 See Clinton/Stores, supra note 1; see also infra note 108.
8 See U.N. Diplomatic Conference Concludes in Rome with Decision to Establish
Permanent International Criminal Court, United Nations Press Release, L/ROM/22
(Jul. 17, 1998) <http:llwww.un.org/icc/pressrel/lrom22.htm> (The Rome Statute
was adopted by a non-recorded vote of 120 in favor, 7 against, and 4 abstentions).
Id.
9 Though the vote was unrecorded, the United States, China, and Israel said they
had voted against the Statute. Among the countries abstaining were India and Mex-
ico (others rumored to have abstained include Libya, Iran, Iraq, and either Qatar or
Yemen).
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At this time it is not clear that the permanent International Crimi-
nal Court adopted at Rome will ever be perceived as compatible with
U.S. foreign policy interests. If this is true, the United States seems
destined to find itself at odds with the rest of the world by failing to
acknowledge and consent to the jurisdiction of this new court. Implicit
in current U.S. policy is the concept that the Court is fundamentally
inconsistent with the international Rule of Law it so frequently pro-
motes - but is that implication supported by international law?
In an attempt to address this issue, this Article will examine 1)
the history of the United States' role in the movement towards an in-
ternational Rule of Law, beginning with its leadership in establishing
the Nazi war crimes tribunals; 2) the history of the U.S. position on
the court; and 3) a substantive legal analysis of the treaty options op-
posed by the United States. By tracing these threads, we hope to iden-
tify whether the concept of an international Rule of Law is actually
compatible with U.S. interests, whether those interests have changed,
and whether the concept of an international Rule of Law itself has
changed since articulated by Justice Jackson and in the London Char-
ter, pursuant to which the International Military Tribunal was estab-
lished.
A. The Rule of Law and Nuremberg
Looking at the Rome agenda in historical perspective, one should
appreciate that the proposed jurisdiction of the International Criminal
Court has roots in 20u and indeed 19  century concepts of transna-
tional and international justice. The core crimes at Nuremberg:
Crimes against Peace, War Crimes, and Crimes Against Humanity,
can all be found in the corpus of international law set forth throughout
this century and before. 1 Nuremberg contributed significantly to the
10 War crimes were also condemned in the Geneva Conventions of 1864 and 1906
and the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907.
1 See Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1546,
1547, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 286; Robert H. Jackson, THE NUREMBERG CASE (1947); see
generally Telford Taylor, Nuremberg Trials, War Crimes and International Law,
International Conciliation No. 450 (1949); see also Robert A. Friedlander, Who Put
Out the Lamps?: Thoughts on International Law and the Coming of World War1, 20
DUQ. L. REv. 570-71 (1982) (discussing the era of modem international law as be-
ginning in 1815 with Congress of Vienna, establishing international war and peace
as governed by law). Many of the concepts wrestled with so vigorously since Nur-
emberg extend far enough back into our history to be irrefutably part of our law:
e.g., State responsibility in terms of international crime was framed from Grotius'
17th century maxim aut dedre autpunire ("extradite or prosecute"). M. CheriffBas-
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expansion of international law by holding heads of state personally
accountable for crimes, including aggressive war, initiated by them.' 2
Pre-Nuremberg, the basic tenets of international law pertained
only to states, 13 as individuals were not the proper subjects of interna-
tional law. 14 Therefore, the foundation of the proposed court - indi-
vidual criminal responsibility - was at odds with Pre-Nuremberg tra-
dition. However, international law following Nuremberg witnessed a
change in thinking regarding the rights, obligations, and duties of the
individual and the state in the international context.
At Nuremberg, the trials were run according to published law and
procedure and even the most heinous defendants were given reason-
able due process of law. 15 At Nuremberg, Justice Jackson reminded
siouni, Characteristics of International Criminal Law Conventions, in INTERNA-
TIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 1, 3 (M. Cheriff Bassiouni ed., 1986).
12 See WHITNEY HARRIS, TYRANNY ON TRIAL 23, 35 (1995).
13 See, e.g., L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 362 (1912). To the
extent that states had any international legal obligations relating to individuals, these
obligations extended only insofar as individuals were the property of states, thus
each might or might not pursue the injury of one of its subjects at its own discretion,
and the parent state was the sole possessor of a cause of action. See Mavrommatis
Palestine Concession (Greece v. U.K.), 1924 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 2 (Aug. 30) (dis-
cussing the jurisdiction given to the Permanent Court of International Justice. Thus,
under the most general tradition, one state has no legal right to assert a cause of ac-
tion against another state for the treatment of its own nationals. See generally Advi-
sory Opinion No. 4, Dispute Between France and Great Britain as to Nationality
Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco, 1923 P.C.I.J. (Ser. B) No. 4 (Oct. 4) (consid-
ering the application of nationality degrees issued in Tunis and Morocco to British
subjects).
14 See, e.g., Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Ltd.
(Belgium v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, at 231 (Feb. 5) ("It is only within the State legal
order that the interests of foreign nationals may acquire protection by means of the
attribution to the latter either of rights or of other personal legal situations in their
favour (faculties, legal powers or expectations").
15 For instance, the Nuremberg Charter and Judgment, as later restated by the Inter-
national Law Commission, and adopted by the United Nations codifies the concept
of individual responsibility:
Any person who commits an act which constitutes a crime under international
law is responsible therefor and liable to punishment.
The fact that international law does not impose a penalty for an act which
constitutes a crime under international law does not relieve the person who
committed the act from responsibility under International Law.
[Vol. 31:47
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the world that "we must never forget that the record on which we
judge these defendants today is the record on which history will judge
us tomorrow .... To pass these defendants ... a poisoned chalice is
to put it to our own lips as well. We must summon such detachment
and intellectual integrity to our task that this trial will commend itself
to posterity as fulfilling humanity's aspirations to do justice." 16
Thus, rather than meting out a summary form of "victors' jus-
tice," the United States took the lead in establishing a system of law
by which certain categories of international criminals would be
brought to justice through a fair trial where the defendants' rights
were respected.
17
Following Nuremberg, the principles of international law recog-
nized in the Nuremberg Charter and Judgment were unanimously af-
firmed in 1946 by the United Nations General Assembly in a resolu-
tion proposed by the United States. 8 In 1948, upon invitation by the
United Nations, the International Law Commission (ILC) studied the
"desirability and possibility of establishing an international judicial
organ for the trial of persons charged with genocide or other crimes
over which jurisdiction will be conferred upon that organ by interna-
tional conventions." 19
This evolution has effected a gradual widening of the exceptions
to the general rule of absolute national sovereignt 2° and support for
The fact that a person who committed an act which constitutes a crime under
international law acted as Head Of State or responsible Government official
does not relieve him from responsibility under international law.
Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribu-
nal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, U.N. GAOR, 5 th Sess., Supp. No. 12, at 11-
14, U.N. Doc. A/1316 [hereinafter Principles of International Law].
16 TRIAL OF MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 2, at 101.
17 As professor and former Nuremberg prosecutor Benjamin Ferencz so aptly puts
it, these trials "were meant to marshal in a new era which made [the core crimes]
punishable under binding International Law that would apply equally to nations and
their leaders." Benjamin B. Ferencz, International Criminal Courts: The Legacy of
Nuremberg, 10 PACE INT'L L. REV. __ (199_) (forthcoming).
18 See G.A. Res. 95, U.N. Doc. A/64/Add.1, at 188 (1946).
19 Study by the International Law Commission of the Question of an International
Criminal Jurisdiction, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No. 13, at 177, U.N. Doc.
A/810 (1948).
20 See, e.g., U.S. v. Von Leeb (High Command Case) Judgement of the Interna-
tional Military Tribunal, Nuernberg [sic], XI Trials of the Major War Criminals 462,
489 (1950): "International law operates as a restriction and limitation on the sover-
eignty of nations. It may also limit the obligations which individuals owe to their
1999]
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the notion that universal jurisdiction21 should be extended over perpe-
trators of criminal activities condemned by all states, such as war
22 23 24 2crimes, genocide,2  torture, and even drug trafficking25 - regard-
states, and create for them international obligations which are binding upon them to
an extent that they must be carried out even if to do so violates a positive law or
directive of that state."
21 "A state has jurisdiction to define and prescribe punishment for certain offenses
recognized by the community of nations as of universal concern, such as piracy,
slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps
certain acts of terrorism .... ." RESTATEMENT [THIRD] OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 404 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS]. See also Jordan J. Paust., Universality and the Responsibility to
Enforce International Criminal Law: No U.S. Sanctuary for Alleged Nazi War
Criminals, 11 Hous. J. INT'L. L. 337, 340 (1989) [hereinafter Paust, Universality];
see also U.S. v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 161 (1820) ("The common law...
recognizes and punishes piracy as a offence, not against its own municipal code, but
as an offence against the law of nations . . .
22 See Paust, Universality, supra note 21.
23 See, e.g, Attorney Gen. of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R., 18 (Isr. Dist. Ct. - Jeru-
salem 1961) aff'd 36 I.L.R. 277 (Isr. Sup. Ct. 1962) (where the Israeli Government
justified the trial (but not the kidnapping) of Adolf Eichmann in part, under the uni-
versality principle). "[T]he reference in Article 6 [of the Genocide Convention] to
territorial jurisdiction ... is not exhaustive. Every sovereign State may exercise its
existing powers within the limits of customary international law. . ." Id. at 39.
24 See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980). The Court indicated
it was construing the First Congress' establishment of "original district court juris-
diction over 'all cases where an alien sues for a tort only [committed] in violation of
the law of nations,"' and held that "deliberate torture perpetrated under color of of-
ficial authority violates universally accepted norms of the international law of hu-
man rights, regardless of the nationality of the parties." Id. "In the modern age, hu-
manitarian and practical considerations have combined to lead the nations of the
world to recognize that respect for fundamental human rights is in their individual
and collective interest .... [T]he torturer has become like the pirate and slave
trader before him, hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind. Our holding
today, giving effect to a jurisdictional provision enacted by our First Congress, is a
small but important step in the fulfillment of the ageless dream to free all people
from brutal violence." (emphasis added). Id. at 890. The authors note that universal-
ity was discussed here only terms of a civil suit.
25 See United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1514 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (citing
with approval the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS § 403:
[N]arcotics offenses provide the strong justification meriting criminal juris-
diction: "Prosecution for activities committed in a foreign state have generally
been limited to serious and universally condemned offenses, such as treason
or traffic in narcotics, and to offenses by and against military forces. In such
[Vol. 31:47
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less of whether or not the criminal acts are argued to have been com-
mitted in the pursuit of some state interest.26 However, the question is
not limited to whether a state can impose punishment upon individu-
als charged with universally condemned behavior, but whether it
must, as a function of state responsibility, punish or extradite28 such
individuals, either as general state obligation29 or as a function of in-
ternational comity.30
cases the state in whose territory the act occurs is not likely to object to regu-
lation by the state concerned." The Restatement therefore explicitly recog-
nizes the reasonableness of extending jurisdiction to narcotics activity such as
that alleged here).
2 Among which, defenses such as superior orders are no longer considered valid
per se. See generally, Jordan J. Paust, Superior Orders and Command Responsibil-
ity, in 3 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: ENFORCEMENT 73 (M. Cherif Bassiouni
ed., 1987) [hereinafter Paust, Superior Ordersl. Neither is a sovereign free from
culpability under international law. See Jordan Paust, Aggression Against Author-
ity: The Crime of Oppression, Politicide and Other Crimes Against Human Rights,
18 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 283, 284-85 (1986) [hereinafter Paust, Aggressionl.
27 Making them "hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind." Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d at 890.
28 For example, a state that captures an indicted war criminal may "surrender the
alleged criminal to the state where the offense was committed, or ... retain the al-
leged criminal for trial under its own legal processes." Hostage Case (U.S. v. List),
11 Trials of the Major War Criminals 757, 1242 (U.S. Mil. Trib. - Nuremberg 1948).
29 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS § 701. Under the Restate-
ment, a state is obligated to respect the human rights of persons subject to its juris-
diction that it has undertaken to respect by international agreement; that states gen-
erally are bound to respect as a matter of customary international law; and that it is
required to respect under general principles of law common to the major legal sys-
tems of the world. Id.
Similarly, Article 8(a) of the 1979 Hostage Convention states: "the State Party in the
territory of which the alleged offender is found shall if it does not extradite him be
obligated without exception whatsoever and whether or not the offense was commit-
ted in its territory, to submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of
prosecution, although proceedings in accordance with the laws of the State."
30 "[C]haracterized most accurately as a golden rule among nations - that each
must give that respect to the laws, policies and interests of others that it would have
others give to its own in the same or similar circumstances." Harold G. Maier, Re-
solving Extraterritorial Conflicts or "There and Back Again, " 26 VA. J. INT. L. 7,
14 (1984). "This principle informs decisions whose goal is to reconcile the fact of
national territorial authority with an international system in which persons and
goods must move across national borders." Id.
Comity is a recognition which one nation extends within its own territory to
the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another. It is not a rule of law,
1999]
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The thrust of important international agreements signed by the
United States is that cooperation in the prosecution of universal
crimes committed by individuals is a function of state responsibility.
31
Further, the United States has repeatedly demonstrated in its courts
that it reserves the right to prosecute foreign nationals for transgres-
sions of customary international law under a theory of universality. 32
but one of practice, convenience, and expediency .... [1]t is a nation's ex-
pression of understanding which demonstrates due regard both to international
duty and convenience and to the rights of persons protected by its own laws.
Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972). Compare:
It makes little sense for State parties that have not accepted the jurisdiction of
the Court with respect to the particular crime under investigation or prosecu-
tion to be under any legal obligation to cooperate with the Court. Nor should
those States be constrained with regard to their authority to institute their own
prosecution or to extradite the offender to a third State rather than the ICC.
Rather, such States should come within the terms of Article 59 of the draft
statute, which calls for the voluntary cooperation of States not Parties to the
statute "on the basis of comity, a unilateral declaration, an ad hoc arrangement
or other agreement with the court." The only exception to this should be for
cases initiated by the Security Council, as to which all States should be obli-
gated to render assistance to the ICC.
Michael P. Scharf, Getting Serious About An International Criminal Court, 6 PACE INT'L
L. REv. 103, 117 (1994).
31 For instance, the four Geneva Conventions, which the United States became
party to in 1956, obligate the United States to assert universal jurisdiction with re-
spect to violations of the four Conventions. The Geneva Conventions provide that
"each party shall be under the obligation to search for persons alleged to have com-
mitted, or to have ordered to be committed.., grave breaches, and shall bring such
persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own courts." Geneva Convention
For the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forced in
the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, at art. 49, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 3146, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, 62; Ge-
neva Convention For the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, at art. 50, 6 U.S.T.
3214, 3250, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, 116; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, at art. 129, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 3418,75 U.N.T.S. 135,
236; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, at art. 146, 6 U.S.T. 3517, 3616, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 386.
32 See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726, F.2d 774, 781,788 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(per curiam) (Edwards J. concurring)(voting to dismiss the action, but making sev-
eral references to domestic jurisdictions over extraterritorial offenses under the uni-
versality principle), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630
F.2d. at 890 (analogizing the defendant, a Paraguayan official accused of commit-
ting torture, to a pirate and slave trader); United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896
[Vol. 31:47
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It would seem axiomatic that U.S. nationals would also be subject to
indictment by foreign states under the same theory. Here, however, is
where the most significant double standard begins to emerge.33
B. International Crime as Defined by Treaty
The modern approaches to limiting national sovereignty have ei-
ther been through the traditional approach (e.g., via treaty), or by re-
conceptualizing the limit of a state's discretion over the treatment of
individuals (e.g., through expanded concepts of humanitarian law).34
Following the Nuremberg trials, a core set of international crimes be-
gan to emerge in agreements between states, declaring that nations
have an obligation and a right to take enforcement action against
criminals who have committed universally deplorable acts. For in-
stance, in dealing with war crimes, the four Geneva Red Cross Con-
ventions of 1949 establish that "[e]ach party shall be under the obliga-
tion to search for personas alleged to have committed, or to have or-
dered to be committed ... grave breaches [of the conventions], and
shall35 bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its
own courts."
36
(D.D.C. 1988) (jurisdiction proper over defendant prosecuted for hijacking and de-
struction of civilian aircraft under, inter alia universal jurisdiction); Von Dardel v.
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 623 F. Supp 246, 254 (D.D.C. 1985) (referring
to the "concept of extraordinary judicial jurisdiction over acts in violation of signifi-
cant international standards... embodied in the principle of 'universal' violations
of international law"); In Re Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp 544,555 (N.D. Ohio) (holding
that Israel's jurisdiction to prosecute alleged Nazi guard "conforms with the interna-
tional law principle of universal jurisdiction"), aff'd sub nom, Demjanjuk v. Pet-
rovsky, 776 F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1985); United States v. Layton, 509 F. Supp. 212,
223 (N.D. Cal. 1981), appeal dismissed, 645 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
452 U.S. 972 (1981).
33 "The United States shall not permit a U.S. soldier to participate in any NATO,
U.N., or other international peacekeeping mission, until the United States has
reached agreement with all of our NATO allies, and the U.N., that no U.S. soldier
will be subject to the jurisdiction of this court." Statement of Senator Jesse Helms at
a hearing of the International Operations Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee, on Jul. 23, 1998, exactly one week after the signing of the Rome
Treaty.
34 See Louis Henkin, Human Rights and 'Domestic Jurisdiction,' in HUMAN
RIGHTs, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE HELSINKI AccoRD 21, 22-26 (Thomas Buer-
genthal ed., 1977).
35 Notable here is that fact that, even in early agreements, the exercise of universal
jurisdiction over individuals was declared both a right and an obligation. See gener-
ally Paust, Universaility, supra note 21, at 337 (arguing that customary international
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Also exemplary is the Genocide Convention. 37 The Convention
declares that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or time of
war, is a crime under international law38 for which an individual per-
petrator is culpable, 39 and for which as under the Geneva Conven-
tions, states have a duty to prosecute.4°
law places an obligation on nation-states to initiate prosecution of persons in their
territory accused of crimes against humanity).
36 The four Geneva Conventions entered into force on October 21, 1950, and the
United States became a party on February 2, 1956. Hence, as a result, the United
States is obligated to assert universal jurisdiction with respect to violations of the
four Conventions. Two Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions were
opened for signature in 1977. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Con-
flicts (Protocol I), Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (dealing with the protection of
victims of international armed conflicts); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Con-
ventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 (ap-
plying to non-international armed conflicts). To date, the vast majority of the States
Parties to the Conventions has ratified both Protocols. The United States has not yet
ratified either Protocol. In 1987, President Reagan asked the Senate for its advice
and consent to the ratification of Protocol II and indicated that the United States
would not ratify Protocol I. See generally Hans-Peter Gasser, An Appeal for Ratifi-
cation by the U.S., 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 912 (1987).
37 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, at art. 1, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter 1948 Genocide Convention].
38 The United States implemented its obligations under the Genocide Convention
when it enacted the Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1988 (the Prox-
mire Act). The Act follows the territoriality and nationality principles of jurisdic-
tion. LAWRENCE J. LEBLANC, THE UNITED STATES AND THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION
180-81 (1991).
39 See generally Raphael Lemkin, Genocide as a Crime Under International Law,
41 AM. J. INT'L L. 145 (1947) (discussing the characteristics, development, and im-
plications of the crime of genocide). Article IV of the Genocide Convention pro-
vides that "persons committing genocide . . . shall be punished, whether they are
constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals." Conven-
tion on the 1948 Genocide Convention, supra note 38, at art. IV. The Convention
defines "genocide" as the commission of certain enumerated acts "with intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as such." Id.
at art. II. The acts constituting genocide are:
(a) killing members of the group; (b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to
members of the group; (c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of
life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d)
imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) forcibly
transferring children of the group to another group.
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As the Restatement [Third] of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States (hereinafter "Restatement (Third)") states, customary
international law also arises out of the practice of nations. 41 Thus, in-
ternational treaty instruments all contribute to the growing body of
customary international law42 by which state action might now be
judged. A number of recent UN-sponsored conventions and treaties
demonstrate a sense that the world is committed to rethinking state
sovereignty, jurisdiction, and enhanced individual rights and respon-
sibilities - thus revising customary international law as it pertains to
state responsibility and individual rights. These instruments include,
Id. at art. IV. The authors note that, to be guilty of the crime of genocide, an indi-
vidual must have committed one of the foregoing acts with the specific intent of
destroying, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group. Thus,
the killing of some members of a group could consequently amount to genocide if
carried out with the intent of destroying the group or a substantial part thereof.
40 "Persons charged with genocide.., shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the
State in the territory of which the act was committed or by such international penal
tribunals as may have jurisdiction." 1948 Genocide Convention, supra note 38, at
art. VI.
41 According the reporter of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS:
[P]ractice accepted as building customary human rights law includes: virtually
universal adherence to the United Nations Charter and its human rights provi-
sions, and virtually universal and frequently reiterated acceptance of the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights even if only in principle; virtually univer-
sal participation of states in the preparation and adoption of international
agreements recognizing human rights principles generally, or particular rights;
the adoption of human rights principles by states in regional organizations in
Europe, Latin America, and Africa (see Introductory Note to this Part); gen-
eral support by states for United Nations resolutions declaring, recognizing,
invoking, and applying international human rights principles as international
law; action by states to conform their national law or practice to standards or
principles declared by international bodies, and the incorporation of human
rights provisions, directly or by reference, in national constitutions and laws;
invocation of human rights principles in national policy, in diplomatic prac-
tice, in international organization activities and actions; and other diplomatic
communications or action by states reflecting the view that certain practices
violate international human rights law, including condemnation and other ad-
verse state reactions to violations by other states. The International Court of
Justice and the International Law Commission have recognized the existence
of customary human rights law.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS § 701, Reporter's Note 2.
42 See I.C.J. STATUTE, at art. 38(1), reprinted in PETER J. LIACOURAS, 2 THE INTER-
NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: MATERIALS ON THE RECORD OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE IN CONTENTIOUS PROCEEDINGS (1962).
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among others,: The U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UN-
CLOS), 43 the Geneva Convention on the High Seas, 44 the Convention
Against the Taking of Hostages,45 the Convention for the Suppression
of the Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft,46 the Convention on the Preven-
tion and Punishment of Crime Against Internationally Protected Per-
sons, Including Diplomatic Agents, 47 and the Convention on the Sup-
pression and Punishment of Apartheid.48
A trend is evident in these international agreements - in recent
decades, most of the world has demonstrated its continued embrace of
an ever tightening international Rule of Law. Perhaps the boldest re-
cent innovation in international law, that of attempting to create an
entirely new obligation for states to interact peacefully, came about
with the 1974 General Assembly Consensus Resolution Defining Ag-
gression.49 Here, Justice Jackson's vision that aggressive war be rec-
43 See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 21 I.L.M.
1261 (1982).
44 Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 82
(superceded by the UNCLOS).
45 International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979,
T.I.A.S. No. 11,081, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205.
46 See Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16,
1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105; see also Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565,
974 U.N.T.S. 177 (requiring contracting states to prosecute even if the state does not
extradite the offender).
47 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally
Protected Persons, Including Diplomats, Dec. 14, 1973, at art. 7, 28 U.S.T., 1975,
1981, 1035 U.N.T.S., 167, 170.
48 International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of
Apartheid, Jul. 18, 1976, 1015 U.N.T.S. 243. Although universal jurisdiction is
permissive rather than mandatory, individuals charged with the crime of apartheid
"may by tried by a competent tribunal of any State Party to the Convention which
may acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the accused or by an international penal
tribunal .... Id. at 246. The United States is not a party to this Convention.
49 G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 142-43, U.N.
Doc. A/9631 (1974). Article 1 defines aggression as "the use of armed force by a
state against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another
State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations ...
." Article 2 provides that "the first use of armed force by a state in contravention of
the United Nations charter is prima facie evidence of an act of aggression," defined
in article 3 to include the invasion by armed forces of another state. Article 3 lists
some acts which qualify as acts of aggression, and includes the sending of armed
bands to carry out acts of armed force against a state of sufficient gravity to be tan-
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ognized as the "the supreme international crime' 5° was recognized for
the first time in an international declaration. Thus, the trend would
seem to indicate that much of the world has come to embrace the am-
bitious tenets of Nuremberg.
C. The United States and the Evolution of International Law
Much of the emerging international law embraced by the rest of
the world has been carefully recognized by the American Law Insti-
tute in its Restatement (Third).5 1 In particular, Section 701, which de-
fines a state's obligations to respect individual rights52 and Section
702 defines elements violative of the customary law of international
individual rights.53 Under these two sections, U.S. practice appears to
tamount to an invasion or attack against the state itself. Finally, Article 5 adopts the
Nuremberg Principles, making armed aggression a crime against peace, and prohib-
iting territorial acquisition by virtue of such aggression. Id.
50 As in the judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal. See HARRIS, supra note 12, at
536.
51 The Restatement notes that "[t]he difference in history and in jurisprudential
origins between the older law of responsibility for injury to aliens and the newer law
of human rights should not conceal their essential affinity and their convergence."
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS, Part VII, Introductory Note. The Re-
statement goes on to point out that "as the law of human rights developed, the law of
responsibility for injury to aliens, as applied to natural persons, began to refer to
violations of their 'fundamental human rights,' and states began to invoke contem-
porary norms of human rights as the basis for claims for injury to their nationals."
Id. See generally F.V. GARCiA-AMADOR ET AL., RECENT CODIFICATION OF THE LAW
OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS (1974).
52 Section 701, entitled "Obligation to Respect Human Rights," states:
A state is obligated to respect the human rights of persons subject to its juris-
diction
(a) that it has undertaken to respect by international agreement;
(b) that states generally are bound to respect as a matter of custom-
ary international law; and
(c) that it is required to respect under general principles of law
common to the major legal systems of the world.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS § 701.
53 Section 702, entitled "Customary International Law of Human Rights," states:
A state violates international law if, as a matter of state policy, it practices,
encourages, or condones
(a) genocide,
(b) slavery or slave trade,
(c) the murder or causing the disappearance of individuals,
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recognize bases under which a nation should, under international law,
be placed under the scrutiny of other states for its treatment of
individuals. 54
The United States has, however, signed and/or ratified very few
accords which open its actions to foreign scrutiny. 55 This is not to say
that the United States, in its foreign policy, has not acknowledged a
few important and controversial human rights conventions, such as the
International Convention on the Rights of the Child,56 the Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, 57 and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women.58 Participation in these compacts
evidences a continued commitment on the part of the United States to
raise the standard of behavior acceptable under international law.
A particularly encouraging demonstration of U.S. commitment to
international humanitarian law and war crimes can be found in its in-
tiation and support, via its U.N. Security Council votes, of ad hoc war
crimes tribunals. These votes, cast in favor of the United Nations Se-
(d) torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or pun-
ishment,
(e) prolonged arbitrary detention,
(f) systematic racial discrimination, or
(g) a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recog-
nized human rights.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS § 702.
54 The authors note that, though this controversial Restatement is by no means
binding as law, it is a scholarly assessment on the part of the ALl, of the active re-
gimes of law affecting foreign policy.
55 For instance, in the case of the UNCLOS, the United States did not want to give
any rights to mine for deep seabed nodules, thereby placing its own economic inter-
est above the interest to establish an important global legal order.
56 Declaration of the Rights of the Child, adopted by the General Assembly of the
United Nations on Nov. 20, 1959, states that "the child shall not be admitted to em-
ployment before an appropriate minimum age; he shall in no case be caused or per-
mitted to engage in any occupation or employment which would prejudice his health
or education, or interfere with his physical, mental, or moral development." 1959
U.N.Y.B. 192, U.N. Sales No. 60.1.1 (signed by the United States in 1959).
57 Adopted Dec. 10, 1984, reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984). Implementing legis-
lation was enacted by the United States in 1984. See Regarding the Implementation
of the Policy of the United States Government in Opposition to the Practice of Tor-
ture by Any Foreign Government, Pub. L No. 98-447, 99 Stat 1721 (1984).
58 President Clinton has urged the ratification of this treaty since 1993. See, e.g.,
Pres. Proc. No. 6637, 58 F. Reg. 65527 (Dec. 10, 1993) The Administration's con-
sent package was submitted to the Senate in 1994 and is still pending there.
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curity Council Resolution 808 adopted on May 23, 1993, establishing
an International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia to
prosecute persons responsible for committing Nuremberg-type war
crimes in the territory of the former Yugoslavia demonstrates an ac-
knowledgement by the United States that at least non-U.S. interna-
tional criminals must be brought to justice. This support was echoed
in Resolution 955 in 1994, establishing the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda.
Other treaties and conventions, like the Land Mine Convention,
59
appear too controversial for U.S. participation, and demonstrate an
apparent schism between U.S. foreign policy and emerging interna-
tional legal concepts embraced by our international friends and allies.
Further, the interface between the foreign policy of the United States
executive branch and that of Congress often indicates the likelihood
that the treaty will enter into effect without advice and consent of the
Senate. Thus, unless a controversial treaty is found to be self-
executing under U.S. law,61 it may have no effect if adequate support
59 Of the 120 signatories to the convention, the United States and Cuba stand alone
as non-signatories in the Western Hemisphere, and the United States and Turkey
stand alone among NATO members who refused to sign. See Landmine Treaty Rati-
fied, Set to Take Effect in Six Months, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, Sept. 17, 1998, available
in 1998 WL 16601056.
60 See, e.g., Huynh Thi Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d. 625, 629 (6th Cir. 1978) (finding the
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
not self-executing); Doe v. Plyler, 628 F.2d 448, 453 (5th Cir. 1980) (dictum that
the Protocol of Buenos Aires, amending the OAS Charter, "has never been consid-
ered self-executing"); In re Alien Children Educ. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 544, 590
(S.D. Tex. 1990) (holding that Article 47 of the Protocol of Buenos Aires was non-
self-executing); Manybeads v. U.S., 730 F. Supp. 1515 (D. Ariz. 1989) (dictum that
the Genocide Convention is not self-executing); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic,
726 F.2d. 774, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J. concurring) (stating that the Hague
Convention on the Laws and Customs of War on Land, the Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, and the OAS Convention to Prevent
and Punish the Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes Against Persons and
Related Extortion That Are of International Significance are not self-executing);
Linder v. Portocarrero, 963 F.2d 332, 334-37 (1 lth Cir. 1992) (declining to address
the district court's finding that the Geneva Conventions are not self-executing). But
see United States v. Noriega, 808 F. Supp. 799 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (stating that the
provisions of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949 would be self-executing).
61 Particularly where the Senate attaches "non-self-executing" declarations to
them. See generally, Stefan A. Riesenfeld & Frederick M. Abbott, The Scope of U.S.
Senate Control over the Conclusion and Operation of Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 571 (1991).
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can not be mustered in the U.S. Senate to supply advice and consent
in favor of ratification.
D. Why Do We Need a Court?
One of the traditional limitations of international law is its lack of
self-contained, binding effect and enforcement mechanisms. 62 Public
international law merely persuades states, as its subjects, to act as ra-
tionally calculating hedonists,63 balancing the discomfort of verbal or
economic rebuke against national interests. Thus, any state actor who
prefers the somewhat anarchical system of effectively unenforceable
international law to a structured, independent tribunal with enforce-
ment power would likely see the court as a direct threat to its national
sovereignty. 64
Even states which prefer the rule of the jungle to the Rule of Law
will probably support actions to punish a state which has become un-
able to defend its own political and territorial sovereignty. Thus, the
international community's approach to the core crimes of the Court
has been to establish ad hoc tribunals. Here, what is termed as ad hoc,
usually ends up meaning post hoc, and justice is done only in hind-
sight.65
Under the current approach, even when an active criminal is iden-
tified, there are no effective mechanisms for intervention and appre-
hension. By lacking the authority to intervene, and without established
ties to national judiciaries and enforcement agencies, ad hoc tribunals
lack what many argue to be the most important feature of an effective
system of law - deterrence.66
62 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, at art. 34, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 ("A treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third state
without its consent"); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS § 324.
63 Although Bentham and Mill saw the utilitarian dynamic of the political pleasure-
over-pain in domestic terms, the same equation applies here, presuming that states
operate as individuals in a global order.
64 "If we truly believe that we are a society that value [sic] the established rules of
the international community - if we truly, believe in the rule of law and not in the
rule of the jungle - then of one thing there should be no doubt: the perpetrators of
these crimes must be brought to justice." 139 CONG. REc. S 10315, 10316 (daily ed.
Aug. 4, 1993) (statement of Senator Christopher Dodd).
65 Save in the case of Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic, who continues to
commit serious breaches of international law even after his indictment by the Yugo-
slav Tribunal.
66 Even the U.S. State Department seemed to recognize this important function of
the court: "Our long-term vision is the prevention of heinous crimes through effec-
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Along with an effective system of law, there must also be an ef-
fective and independent institution. With a permanent International
Criminal Court in place, employing an active and independent prose-
cutor and pre-trial chamber, legal intervention becomes an option. A
permanent institution, properly managed, means efficiency, expertise,
and respect. As an institution, the Court has a level of authority, com-
petence, and respect that could never be gained by an ad hoc tribunal.
The Court's application of international criminal law, cultivating the
expertise of its staff and strengthening communications and enforce-
ment ties with individual states, can only cut the amount of time and
momentum needed to engage in an investigation (as compared to an
ad hoc tribunal, where delay and logistical problems would seem in-
evitable).
In addition to the systemic and institutional benefits of a perma-
nent court, the lessons learned from the two independent tribunals are
numerous and greatly inform the decision-making process. In fact, a
strong argument in favor of a permanent institution can be made on
the basis of logistics and effectiveness alone. For instance, in the case
of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the United
Nations had to face nearly impossible logistics required to establish an
effective foreign tribunal.67 The time and effort required to "micro-
manage" such concerns 68 lead to open speculation as to whether the
U.N. Security Council would likely engage in such activities in the
future. Similarly, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTFY) was burdened by numerous political logistics
including the appointment of a prosecutor,69 establishing support for
the tribunal's statute,70 and electing judges.7 '
tive national law enforcement buttressed by the deterrence of a permanent court."
James P. Rubin, Establishing an International Criminal Court, U.S. DEP'T ST., OF-
FICE OF THE SPOKESMAN PRESS STATEMENT (Apr. 2, 1998) (visited Aug. 1, 1998)
<http:llsecretary.state.gov/wwwlbriefings/statements/1998/ps980402.htm> [herein-
after Rubin, Establishing an International Court].
67 See generally M. Cherif Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-Five
Years: The Need to Establish a Permanent International Criminal Court, 10 HARv.
HUM. RTS. f. 11, 49 (1997) (arguing that establishing the tribunal in another country
was fraught with logistics problems).
68 Such factors include the fact that defendants and witnesses had to come to Tan-
zania from Rwanda, the lack of a local infrastructure for the tribunal, and the time
required to negotiate a U.N. host country agreement with Tanzania. Id.
69 See, e.g., VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 161-63 (1995).
70 See id. at 33-34.
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Thus, the need for a system of international criminal law, the jus-
tifications for a permanent institution (in terms of respect, effective-
ness, and efficiency), and the deterrent effects72 of a force for inde-
pendent intervention all lend credence to the decision made at Rome.
E. International Crime in the Years Since Nuremberg
Without some level of circumspection, one might be led to be-
lieve that the purpose of Nuremberg was served by prosecuting Nazi
war criminals, and that the need to deter and intervene in recent dec-
ades has been extremely rare. One might ask "deter what?" and "in-
tervene where?" But Hitler and the butchers of the Third Reich were
not the only international criminals of this century.
To the contrary, the years since Nuremberg are replete with con-
sistent indicia that the individual may be at peril in his or her own
state. The laws of war73 and universal declarations in favor of human
rights have met with egregious enforcement failures on too many oc-
casions. Worse, though, is the growing sense that these failures of law
and international agreement pass without inciting the world, let alone
the United States, to anything like the outrage surrounding the Holo-
caust.
Hitler perhaps put it best when uttering the now well-worn phrase
"who remembers the Armenians?, ' '74 speaking of the 500-600 thou-
71 See id. at 144-45.
72 "Successful prosecutions in such a court would not only result in punishment for
the perpetrators, but would help deter behavior repulsive to the international com-
munity." 140 CONG. REC. S105 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1994) (final report of the United
States Commission on Improving the Effectiveness of the United Nations).
13 The Army Field Manual on The Law of Land Warfare defines war as "a legal
condition of armed hostility between States * * * usually accompanied by * * * acts
of violence * ** ." U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL, THE LAW OF LAND
WARFARE FM 27-10, 8 (1956) [hereinafter U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MAN-
UAL]. Regimes of jus ad bello and jus in bello, underpinning the concept of a just
war, are part of the fundamental laws of nations, and the basis of international legal
enforcement and cooperation derives from the maxim aut dedere autjudicare. See
generally HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS (A.C. Campbell trans., Hyperion
1993) (1625).
74 See JAMES F. WILLIS, PROLOGUE To NUREMBERG: THE POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY
OF PUNISHING WAR CRIMINALS OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR 173 (1982) (quoting
Adolf Hitler, Speech to the Chief Commanders and Commanding Generals on the
Obersalzburg (Aug. 22, 1939) in 7 BRITISH DOCUMENTS ON FOREIGN POLICY, 1919-
1939 258 (E.L. Woodward et al. eds., 1949-55)); see also Vahakn N. Dadrian,
Genocide as a Problem of National and International Law: The World War I Arme-
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sand domestic Armenians slaughtered by the Turkish government in
1915.75 In a moment of brazen candor, Hitler reassured his command-
ers that time would erode the horror of their actions. Fortunately, the
proceedings at Nuremberg proved him terribly wrong. The summary
cry from Nuremberg was "never again."76
Still, acts of mass violence"7 litter the landscape of the 2 0 th cen-
tury. The genocidal acts of the Japanese, Russians/Soviets, and Cam-
bodians occupy a place in the minds of many. Most of the world con-
demns Pol Pot,78 and more recently Saddahm Hussein,79 as interna-
nian Case and Its Contemporary Legal Ramifications, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 221,242
(1989) (reviewing the Turko-Armenian conflict).
75 See also Robert Melson, Provocation or Nationalism: A Critical Inquiry in the
Armenian Genocide of 1915, in FRANK CHALK & KURT JONASSOHN, THE HISTORY
AND SOCIOLOGY OF GENOCIDE 266, 270 (1990) (providing statistics on the numbers
of Armenians killed or deported).
76 "The motto 'never again' belongs to the entire world community, not as a vindic-
tive slogan, but as a reflection of our moral-ethical values and of our intellectual
commitment to protect future generations from events similar to those that led to
Nuremberg (and Tokyo). If Nuremberg did nothing else, that is indeed a worthy
legacy." M. Cherif Bassiouni, Nuremberg: Forty Years After, 80 AM. SOC'YINT'LL.
65 (1988).
77 R. J. Rummel aptly refers to crimes of mass democide, genocide, and politicide
at the vast scale seen in the 20'h century as "megamurder." R. J. Rummel, Megamur-
ders, SOC'Y, Sept./Oct. 1992, at 47-48.
78 As Rummel reminds us:
Out of a 1970 population of probably nearly 7,100,000, Cambodia probably
lost almost 4 million people to war, rebellion, manmade famine, genocide,
politicide, and mass murder. From democide alone, almost all concentrated in
the years 1970 to 1980, successive governments and guerrilla groups mur-
dered almost 3,300,000 men, women and children (including 35,000 foreign-
ers). Most of these, probably close to 2,400,000 were murdered by the com-
munist Khmer Rouge.
R.J. RUMMEL, DEATH BY GOVERNMENT, 160 (1994). For more than a decade after
the Khmer Rouge were ousted by Vietnam in 1979, the United States refused to lend
its backing to a trial of Pol Pot for genocide, nor take any action that might lead to
such an outcome. See id.
79 Saddam Hussein could be indictable under number of theories. For instance,
many have called for a war crimes indictment. See, e.g, 138 CONG. REC. H8578
(daily ed., Sept. 16, 1992) (statement of Congressman Weldon) (expressing frustra-
tion that a war crimes indictment, while clearly supported, seemed impracticable).
Others have advocated charges for the commission of genocide for using poison gas
against the Kurds. See Theodore Meron, International Criminalization of Internal
Atrocities, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 554, 554 (1995). Additionally, the authors note that
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tional criminals. Yet, one must ask to what end? What effect does this
condemnation carry?
Other horrors of this century spring less readily to mind: the
death and displacement of millions in Bangladesh, the murder of
750,000 in Uganda, the slaughter of 250,000-500,000 members of the
Communist Party in Indonesia, 81 the massacre of some 200,000 in
East Timor,82 annihilation of at least 70,000 peasants by death squads
in El Salvador,83 the deaths of as many as 50,000 Tutsis in Burundi,84
and some 30,000 state-sponsored "disappearances" in Argentina's
"Dirty War., 85 Most recently the criminal acts in the former Yugosla-
via and Rwanda have occupied the minds of the world and, finally,
inspired a call to action both asked and answered by the international
community.
The massive number of deaths blurs the human horror of these
events. Terms such as murder, torture, gender-specific persecution, 86
and starvation87 do not come close to capturing the unspeakable in-
humanity committed in the name of the state, and under the auspices
arguments could obviously be made that Saddam Hussein is, depending on the defi-
nition, guilty of committing acts of unprovoked aggressive war against the territory
of Kuwait.
80 "The devastation wrought by the Pakistani army was enormous, although esti-
mates of casualties vary widely. Between one million and three million were killed;
about two million were rendered homeless; and about ten million fled across the
border to India, where they had to live in conditions of unimaginable hardship, in
spite of India's best efforts." CHALK & JONASSOHN, supra note 75, at 396.
81 Id. at 381.
82 The Government of Indonesia occupied East Timor with a brutal hand, resettling
hundreds of thousands of East Timorese in camps in the late 1970's, and has been
charged by the International Red Cross of deliberately starving more than 100,000
East Timorese during the same period. See 139 CONG. REC. S12311, 12345 (daily
ed. Sept. 23, 1993) (statement of Senator Feingold).
83 See 136 CONG. REC. S16137, 16142 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1990) (statement of Sena-
tor Dodd).
84 CHALK & JONASSOHN, supra note 75, at 387.
85 Prepared Remarks by Professor Michael P. Scharf before the International Op-
erations Subcommittee of the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, infra
note 218.
86 E.g., "individual or mass rape, forced pregnancy, forced abortion, enforced pros-
titution, any form of indecent assault or act of violence against refugee women,
girls, and children."
8' See George Alfred Mudge, Starvation as a Means of Warfare, 4 INTL LAW. 228,
229 (1970) (discussing massive starvation in Biafra, Nigeria).
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of some system of authority. Behind each of these disasters, individu-
als made the choices and carried out acts of hideous carnage, but their
names are lost or forgotten.
Most disturbingly, the lists and statistics somehow fail to convey
a simple message - despite our best efforts at Nuremberg, acts of
unbelievable criminal impunity have happened, are happening, and,
apparently, will happen again.
We must also remember that the savagery committed by indi-
viduals in other countries in this century does not leave the United
States free from concern. One must ask whether the acts of William L.
Calley88 and the de minimus punishment8 9 he ultimately received put
the United States on adequate footing to casually immunize itself
from the Nuremberg principles.
90
Thus, for all of the above reasons, both the legal foundation of
and the functional necessity for the Court seem clear.
88 U.S. Army Lieutenant William Calley was convicted for the "premeditated mur-
der of 22 infants, children, women, and old men, and of assault with intent to murder
a child of about 2 years of age" in the My Lai massacre. His defense was that he
misunderstood his superior's orders. See U.S. v. Calley, 46 C.M.R. 1131 (1973),
aff'd, 48 C.M.R. 19 (1973). Captain Medina, his superior officer, was also prose-
cuted.
89 Overall, Calley was implicated in the intentional killing of some four hundred
Vietnamese civilians at My Lai. As a result, he was
... imprisoned for only a short time before having his sentence commuted by
President Nixon. Many of his associates, meanwhile, were not charged with
any crime at all while others were acquitted by military courts. Former Nur-
emberg Chief Prosecutor Telford Taylor has stated that General William C.
Westmoreland, a former Commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam, might be
convicted as a war criminal if he were held to the same standard established at
the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials.
S. REP. No 103-71 at 383938 (1993).
90 Senator Helms seems at ease in clarifying this divergence. As his spokesman,
Marc Thiessen, said at Rome "We see no reason to put American citizens or Ameri-
can foreign policy up to the judgment of the world." Mark Matthews, Court Has to
Get By Without U.S.; Tribunal: Denied the Right to Exempt its Nationals from the
Jurisdiction of the Planned International Criminal Court, America Opts Out of the
Treaty, BALT. SuN, Jul. 22, 1998, at 2A.
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II. THE UNITED STATES AND THE COURT
A. Establishing U.S. Support for the Court
U.S. involvement in the development of the proposed court cur-
rently spans over twenty years. In 1978, the American Bar Associa-
tion adopted a resolution urging the Department of State to open ne-
gotiations for a convention to establish an international criminal court
with jurisdiction over international crimes of hijacking, violence
aboard aircraft, crimes against diplomats and internationally protected
persons, murder, and kidnapping. 1
Since 1986, the U.S. Congress has repeatedly proposed legisla-
tion pointing to the need for the establishment of an international
criminal court to prosecute individuals who have committed the most
serious international crimes and called on the United States to pursue
the possible establishment of such a court. In the 101st Congress, in
the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Ap-
propriations Act, 1991,92 Congress required the President and the Ju-
dicial Conference of the United States to report to the Congress on the
desirability of establishing an international criminal court. 9 -
In 1992, the American Bar Association adopted a follow-up reso-
lution calling on the U.S. government to work toward solving the le-
gal and practical issues regarding the establishment of an international
criminal court.
94
B. Progress in the Senate
In 1993, the 103d Congress, in section 517(b) of the Foreign Re-
lations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995, 95 expressed as
91 Professor Henry T. King worked on this resolution and played a key role in its
passage. Eds.
92 H.R. 5114, 101st Cong., 104 Stat. 1979 (1990). In the Foreign Operations Ap-
propriations Bill passed by the Congress and signed into law by the President in
1990, there was a provision for the exploration by the President of the creation of an
international criminal court which was signed into law in the 101st Congress as Pub-
lic Law 101-09513. Id. at 2066-67.
93 Id.
94 American Bar Association Task Force on an International Criminal Court: Final
Report (1992), reprinted in 140 CONG. REC. S105 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1994) (spon-
sored by the ABA Task Force on an International Criminal Court and by the New
York State Bar Association).
9' H.R. 2333, 103d Cong., 108 Stat. 382 (1994).
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the sense of the Senate that the establishment of an international
criminal court would greatly strengthen an international Rule of Law,
that such a court would serve United States interests, and that the
United States should advance this proposal at the United Nations.
Senators Christopher Dodd,96 Arlen Specter, and, to a lesser de-
gree, Dianne Feinstein have all provided support and leadership in the
movement towards establishing a permanent court. This support cul-
minated in the 1993 Senate Joint Resolution 3297 "calling for the
United States to support efforts of the United Nations to conclude an
international agreement to establish an international criminal court."
98
The Senate Resolution sponsoring the International Criminal Court
Act of 1993, proposed a sense of the Congress that:
(1) the establishment of an international criminal court with jurisdic-
tion over crimes of an international character would greatly
strengthen the international Rule of Law;
(2) such a court would thereby serve the interests of the United
States and the world community; and
(3) the United States delegation should make every effort to advance
this proposal at the United Nations.
In Senate Report 103-71, the Senate found
(1) the freedom and security of the international community rests on
the sanctity of the Rule of Law;
(3) the prosecution of individuals suspected of carrying out such acts is
often impeded by political and legal obstacles such as disputes over
extradition, differences in the structure and capabilities of national
courts, and the lack of uniform guidelines under which to try such
individuals;
(4) the war crimes trials held in the aftermath of World War II at Nur-
emberg, Germany, and Tokyo, Japan, demonstrated that fair and
effective prosecution of war criminals could be carried out in an in-
ternational forum;
96 Note that Senator Dodd's Father, Thomas J. Dodd, served as Executive Trial
Counsel for the U.S. prosecution team at Nuremberg.
97 In 1991, section 599E(b) & (c) of the Foreign Operations Act directed the United
States to explore the need for the establishment of an international criminal court
and report on the results of efforts to establish an international criminal court. H.R.
5114, 101st Cong., 104 Stat. 2066-67 (1990).
98 139 CONG. REc. S889, 930 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1993) (Senator Dodd reading the
caption to Senate Joint Resolution 32).
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(5) since its inception in 1945 the United Nations has sought to build
on the precedent established at the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials by
establishing a permanent international criminal court with jurisdic-
tion over crimes of an international character;
(6) United Nations General Assembly Resolution 44/39, adopted on
December 4, 1989, called on the International Law Commission to
study the feasibility of an international criminal court;
(7) in the years after passage of that resolution the International Law
Commission has made great strides in establishing a framework for
such a court, including
(A) the adoption of a draft Code of Crimes Against the
Peace and Security of Mankind;
(B) the creation of a Working Group on an International
Criminal Jurisdiction and the formulation by the Work-
ing Group of several concrete proposals for the estab-
lishment and operation of an international criminal
court; and
(C) the determination that an international criminal court
along the lines of that suggested by the Working Group
is feasible and that the logical next step would be to
proceed with the formal drafting of a statute for such a
court;
(9) given the developments of recent years, the time is propitious for
the United States to lend its support to this effort.
The Joint Resolution, passed by the Foreign Relations Committee
in an eleven to seven vote on May 20, 1993, called for a response
from the President by October of that same year. In the words of
Senator Dodd, this act did not bind the United States to any particular
proposal. 99 It, rather, asked the Senate to decide whether it would be
"in the interest of the United States, which has had a long standing
commitment to the Rule of Law, to try to adopt those basic principles
99 In the words of Senator Dodd:
The operative language of this legislation-and I have read it to my colleagues
in this Chamber is very clear. It does not bind us to any particular proposal. It
merely says, do you think this is worth doing? Do you see it as being in the in-
terest of the United States, which has had a longstanding commitment to the
rule of law, to try to adopt those basic principles on an international level?
140 CONG. REC. S 96, 102-03 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1994) (statement of Senator Dodd).
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on an international level."'100 In January of 1994, the Department of
State Authorization Act was amended, in section 170A, 1°1 to provide
further support for a court, again, without supporting any particular
proposal.
C. Progress Towards Executive Action
In 1995, the House introduced a resolution to establish U.S. rec-
ognition for the punishment of war crimes. 0 2 Following a heated Sen-
ate debate over whether or not to support court negotiations, the
House introduced a parallel resolution103 in the summer of 1997.
Though no direct action was taken beyond referring the resolution to
the House Committee on International Relations, the House made it
clear that it expected executive action on this proposal.
100 Id.
101 Section 170A, Policy With Respect to the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court:
The purpose of this provision is to place the United States Congress on record
in support of the concept of an international criminal court.
Section 170A(a) contains congressional findings regarding international
crimes and the international communitys [sic] response.
Section 170A(b) expresses the Sense of the Congress that the establishment of
an international criminal court would strengthen the international Rule of Law
and would thereby be in the best interests of the United States and the interna-
tional community.
Section 170A(c) requires the Administration to report to Congress by no later
than February 1, 1994, on developments relating to and U.S. efforts in sup-
port of the establishment of such a court.
FOREiGN RELATIONS AUTHORIZATION ACT, FiscAL YEARs 1994 AND 1995, S. REP.
No. 103-07 at 34 (1993).
'o2 See War Crimes Act of 1995, H.R. 2587, 104e" Cong. (1995). "H.R. 2587, as
revised by the U.S. Department of State and Defense, would finally implement the
steps we were required to have taken forty years ago." War Crimes Act of 1995,
Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims of the Committee on
the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 104 th Cong. 34 (1996) (statement of Mark
S. Zaid).
103 H.R.J. Res. 89, 105th Cong. (1997) (a "joint resolution calling on the President to
continue to support and fully participate in negotiations at the United Nations to
conclude an international agreement to establish an international criminal court").
The resolution was introduced by Representative Kennedy and thirty-six co-
sponsors, including Representatives Leach, Delahunt, Stark, McNulty, Evans, and
Woolsey. Id.
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In October 1995, President Clinton presided over the inaugura-
tion of the Dodd Center at the University of Connecticut. 1°4 During
the ceremony, President Clinton expressed support for a permanent
war crimes tribunal, stating "all nations around the world who value
freedom and tolerance [should] establish a permanent international
criminal court to prosecute, with the support of the United Nations
Security Council, serious violations of humanitarian law." 105
The President went on to call the proposed permanent court "the
ultimate tribute to the people who did such important work at Nurem-
berg. ' 0 6 Beyond a tribute, the President acknowledged that the court
would "send a strong signal to those who would use the cover of war
to commit terrible atrocities that they cannot escape the consequences
of such actions. 10 7
During and following 1995, the Clinton Administration continued
to speak in favor of the establishment of the Court, 10 8 without stating
104 The program spanned three days. Professor King spoke on day two and Presi-
dent Clinton spoke on day one. When Clinton made these remarks, he was met with
sustained cheering by the audience in attendance.
105 Clinton, supra note 1.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 In the months before the Rome conference, President Clinton made several
statements which inspired the optimism of those in favor of the Court:
In Rwanda, we must hold accountable all those who may abuse human rights,
whether insurgents or soldiers. Internationally, as we meet here, talks are un-
derway at the United Nations to establish a permanent international criminal
court. Rwanda and the difficulties we have had with this special tribunal un-
derscores the need for such a court. And the United States will work to see
that it is created.
President Clinton, Remarks by the President to Genocide Survivors, Assistance
Workers, and U.S. and Rwanda Government Officials, Mar. 25, 1998, available in
1998 WL 135516; "The President ... talked about how slow the International Tri-
bunal had been on Rwanda and once again repeated what he has been talking about
since 1994, I believe, at the United Nations, which is the need for a permanent inter-
national criminal court." Press Briefing by National Security Advisor Sandy Berger
Mar. 25, 1998; "In 1995, President Clinton announced U.S. support for a Permanent
International Criminal Court, and we are committed to the establishment of a Court
with broad-based support before the end of the Century." Fact Sheets on U.S. Efforts
to Promote Human Rights, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Dec. 9,
1997, available in 1997 WL 760980; "[b]efore the century ends, we should establish
a permanent international court to prosecute the most serious violations of humani-
tarian law." President Bill Clinton, Remarks to the 52nd U.N. General Assembly,
Sept. 22, 1997, available in 1997 WL 586481.
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specific reservations regarding any of the proposals submitted for
consideration by the United Nations. In 1997, the Congress expressed
a compelling desire to move forward:
The crimes under negotiation for inclusion in the international
criminal court's jurisdiction are the most serious and horrendous of
international crimes, such as genocide and crimes against human-
ity, and the failure to punish such crimes offends worldwide stan-
dards of law and morality and threatens the establishment of peace
and reconciliation.
The time is right for the creation of a permanent international
criminal court and the United States should continue to support
strongly its establishment and participate fully in the preparation of
provisions under which such a court can be established and can op-
erate fairly and effectively. 109
Thus, having passed through extensive debate in both the House
and Senate, the U.S. Congress clearly indicated that the formation of a
Court was generally in line with U.S. foreign policy and domestic in-
terests.
D. The State Department
When speaking before the Senate Foreign Relations committee
one year before the Rome conference, David Scheffer, nominated by
President Clinton as Ambassador-at-Large Designate for War Crimes
Issues, stated his firm commitment to both the punishment and the
deterrence of international crime as a part of the international Rule of
Law.110 As a seasoned international lawyer and a ten-year veteran of
the foreign affairs community, Scheffer promised the Senate that, if
confirmed, he would work tirelessly as a non-partisan to confront
"atrocities, or those crimes which define the most extreme human
10 H.R.J. Res. 89, 105t Cong. (1997).
110 On the brink of his appointment, Mr. Scheffer stated:
[W]ar crimes has [sic] become a growth industry in international affairs.
Genocide, crimes against humanity, and violations of the laws and customs of
war are the currency of modem conflict across the globe. My job, if I have the
privilege to serve our country, will be to help bring war criminals to justice
and to deter aspiring genocidists from committing their heinous crimes ....
The President and the Secretary of State have asked me to undertake these du-
ties because of the importance they attach to the Rule of Law.
Foreign Relations Nominations: Congressional Testimony Before the U.S. Senate
Comm. On Foreign Relations, Federal Document Clearing House, Jul. 15, 1997,
available in 1997 WL1 1234770 (statement of David J. Scheffer, Ambassador-at-
Large-Designate for War Crimes Issues).
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rights abuses against peoples." '' His speech appeared to be honest
and sincere, and his conviction to promoting an international Rule of
Law seemed unquestionable.1 2 In general, the appointment of Mr.
Scheffer to this post inspired optimism that the court would become a
reality with U.S. support.
The following year, the State Department continued to declare its
support for the proposed court. 113 As the Rome conference drew near,
however, it became clear that, while "strongly support[ing] the estab-
lishment of a fair, effective and properly constituted International
Criminal Court," 114 the State Department was using careful language
to convey something more, and that the devil would be in the de-
tails."
5
"' "If confirmed, I would focus immediately on the former Yugoslavia, the Great
Lakes region of central Africa, Cambodia, and Iraq as areas where serious violations
of international humanitarian law have occurred and demand our most serious atten-
tion." Id.
112 This is evidenced also by his support for the Independent War Crimes Tribunals,
and his four-year tour at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace where he
maintained an active involvement with war crimes issues, particularly during the
Gulf war.
113 See, Remarks of David J. Scheffer, U.S. Ambassador-At-Large Designate For
War Crimes Issues, The Future of International Criminal Justice, Address at the
Peace Palace, The Hague, Netherlands, September 19, 1997. Remarks of David J.
Scheffer, U.S. Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues, (visited Aug. 1, 1998)
<http://www.state.gov/www/global/narcoticslaw/970919_scheffer.html>; see also,
U.S. Policy and the Proposed Permanent International Criminal Court, Address
Before the Carter Center, Atlanta, Georgia Nov. 13, 1997, (visited Aug. 1, 1998)
<http://www.state.gov/www/policy-yemarks/971113_scheffertribunal.html>.
114 See, e.g., James P. Rubin, U.S. Position on Self-Initiating Prosecutor at the Rome
Conference on Establishment of an International Criminal Court, U.S DEP'T STATE
OFFICE OF THE SPOKESMAN PRESS STATEMENT (June 23, 1998) (visited Aug. 1,
1998) <http://secretary.state.gov/www/briefings/statements/1998/ps980623a.html>
[hereinafter Rubin, Self-Initiating Prosecutor].
115 For instance, qualifications such as "strong," "effective," and "properly consti-
tuted," would be open to huge debate. "[O]ur desire to support the process does not
dilute our determination to design a document that reflects a variety of U.S. con-
cerns, including the role of the U.N. Security Council, deferral to capable national
legal systems, jurisdiction, elements of offenses, rules of evidence, and criminal
procedure." James B. Foley, U.S. Participation in the Rome Conference on the Es-
tablishment of an International Criminal Court, U.S. DEP'T ST. OFFICE OF THE
SPOKESMAN PRESS STATEMENT (June 12, 1998) (visited Aug. 1, 1998)
<http://secretary.state.gov/www/briefings/statements/1998/ps980612a.html>.
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Thus, as the Rome Conference drew near, U.S. support for the
Court was strong and resolute.
H. ThE RoME CONFERENcE
A. U.N. Preparatory Conferences and the Issues on the Table in
Rome
The United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 44/39
on December 4, 1989, calling on the ILC to study the feasibility of an
International Criminal Court. The draft report of the International Law
Commission issued in July 1990 expressed the Commission's agree-
ment in principle with the idea of establishing a permanent interna-
tional criminal court. Subsequently, the United Nations General As-
sembly adopted Resolution 47/33 on November 25, 1992, calling on
the ILC to begin the process of drafting a statute for an international
criminal court at its next session.
Based upon the report of the ad hoc committee, the United Na-
tions General Assembly adopted Resolution 50/46 on December 18,
1995, establishing a preparatory committee on the establishment of an
international criminal court to further review the substantive issues
arising out of the draft statute of the ILC and draft texts, with a view
towards preparing a widely acceptable consolidated text of a conven-
tion for an international criminal court as a next step toward consid-
eration by a conference of plenipotentiaries. The work of this prepara-
tory committee in 1996 and 1997 made, in the words of Congress,
"encouraging and substantial progress toward achieving such a con-
solidated text." The ILC presented a draft statute for an international
criminal court at its 46th session on September 1, 1994.
The United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 49/53
on December 9, 1994, establishing an ad hoc committee, open to all
states, which met for four weeks in 1995 to review the major substan-
tive and administrative issues arising out of the draft statute prepared
by the ILC and to consider arrangements for the convening of an in-
ternational conference of plenipotentiaries.
The United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution
51/207 calling for up to nine weeks of negotiations by the preparatory
committee in 1997 and the beginning of 1998 to complete the drafting
of a widely accepted consolidated text of a convention for a diplo-
matic conference in June 1998.
Ultimately, a total of five preparatory conferences would lead up
to the Rome conference, out of which national and Non-governmental
Organization (NGO) delegations managed to produce a draft statute
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that embraced the gambit of state interests discussed since the ILC
first examined the court in the 1950s. 116 The Statute,' 17 consisted of
thirteen parts and 116 articles. Most articles in the statute were heav-
ily bracketed with a number of options, each of which would be dis-
cussed at Rome. Given the ambitious agenda, it could be reasonably
anticipated that five weeks would not be enough time to establish con-
sensus on every issue.
B. Defending U.S. Interests in Rome
During the preparatory conferences, some of the United States
bargaining points began to crystallize, and it appeared that there were
inevitable differences of opinion between the United States and its
allies on key issues. Still, the negotiations began at Rome with a
guardedly optimistic sense that a compromise could be reached.
The first area of concern was the general jurisdiction of the court.
The United States posed serious questions regarding the subject mat-
ter over which the court should have automatic jurisdiction - the is-
sue of aggression and the three core crimes, 118 including whether or
not the court would respond to crimes committed during internal
armed conflict. 119 Second were the "trigger mechanisms" by which an
indictment would be brought, including the relative roles of the prose-
cutor, the U.N. Security Council, the pre-trial chamber, and the in-
volved State's consent. Third were concerns over the possible codifi-
cation of new definitions of international crime (e.g., rape, murder,
116 In 1950, the United Nations General Assembly set up a Committee on Interna-
tional Criminal Jurisdiction consisting of representatives of seventeen member
states. The Committee was charged with preparing concrete proposals on the estab-
lishment of an International Criminal Court that could administer the draft Code of
Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind (Draft Code), which the Interna-
tional Law Commission was simultaneously drafting. The Committee submitted a
draft statute in 1951, which was amended by a Second Committee in 1953. G.A.
Res. 489, U.N. GAOR, 9th Sess., Supp. No. 12, at 1-2, U.N. Doe. A/2645 (1954).
117 UNITED NATIONS, UNITED NATIONS DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE OF PLENIPOTENTI-
ARIES ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, REPORT OF
THE PREPARATION COMMITTEE ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT, U.N. Doc. AICONF 138/2/Add.1 (1998) [hereinafter UNITED NA-
TIONS DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE].
118 War Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity, and Genocide. See supra note 11 and
accompanying text.
"9 See James P. Rubin, U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing: U.S. Position
on Creation of International Criminal Tribunal (June 15, 1998) (visited Aug 1, 1998)
<http://secretary.state.gov/www/briefings/9806/980615db.html>.
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etc.). Fourth, the concept of "complementarity," meaning that the
court must respect good faith domestic efforts to prosecute individuals
who have been charged with international crime. Other issues in-
cluded the sources of funding for the court and its relationship with
the United Nations, judicial cooperation and compliance with deci-
sions of the court, the national security exception to compliance, and
double jeopardy.
On the whole, before the Rome Conference, the list of issues
concerning the United States positions did not appear to be prospec-
tively irresolvable. As the time drew near to signing, however, the ri-
gidity of the U.S. posture on key issues and the growing obstructionist
role it played proved it to be otherwise. The question naturally arises,
if the State Department had an agenda other than the one elaborated
above, what was it and who authored it?
C. The Elusive Senator Helms
Obviously, an issue as politically contentious as an International
Criminal Court will result in a significant diversity of opinions and
agendas in Washington. The State Department's agenda (at least its
formal one) must be viewed in perspective with the various congres-
sional and departmental agendas. In retrospect, an important element
of the U.S. position in Rome was apparently framed by influential
members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. As early as
1993, it became apparent that the powerful chairman of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Jesse Helms, would not sup-
port an International Criminal Court in any form.120 This was flatly
conveyed in his Amendment No. 1254 to the Department of State Au-
thorization Act of 1994, which stated as its purpose "[t]o strike all
language in Section 170A relating to support for an international
criminal court." 121 Ultimately, Senator John Kerry moved to table the
Helms amendment to strike section 170a. The motion was carried
fifty-five to forty-five in favor of tabling the amendment.
122
120 See SEN. REP. No. 103-71 (1993) (Statement of Senator Jesse Helms).
121 140 CONG. REc. S96, 100 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1994).
122 S-123 (Temp. Rec.) 103d CONG. (1993). This is not to say that the endorsement
of the court did not remain conservative. As the motion was carried, after a second
vote, those favoring tabling the Helms' amendment contended
[Elndorsing the language in this bill in favor of establishing an international
criminal court is in no way an endorsement of any current proposals, and is
certainly not an endorsement of any of the frightening scenarios painted by
the proponents of the Helms amendment. Quite simply, the language that the
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In the exchanges on his proposed amendment, Senator Helms
suggested three bases for not supporting the court. First, "who would
sit in judgment?" In this regard, he clearly doubted that the judges of
the Court could ever be free from political influence. 123 Second, "what
constitutes an international crime?" He feared the potential substan-
tive jurisdiction of the court, though no Senate bill or resolution had
yet established support for a specific jurisdiction of the court.1 24 Fi-
nally "what constitutional questions are raised?" Again, without
adopting an actual statute, the Senate had not proposed a course of
action which was inherently constitutional or unconstitutional. It had
merely proposed that the United States support and participate in the
development of the court. Certainly Senator Helms did not miss the
ultimate importance that any proposed treaty would have to come
back through the Senate for advice and consent.125 Even more unfor-
tunately, the Senator's insights into potential problems would not ul-
timately be addressed by him, in that, by merely posing these ques-
tions, he appeared to have already decided against the Court.
Ultimately, the Senator's objections boiled down to a single
word: "sovereignty." As Senator Dodd pointed out, the Court would
require facing the "age-old struggle between the rights of individuals,
Helms amendment would strike merely urges that we work to create an inter-
national criminal court.
Id. The conservative approval remained grounded in a preservation of U.S. legal
tenets:
[W]e do not take lightly the concerns of our colleagues. A politicized, anti-
American international court would be extremely dangerous. We, like they, do
not support the creation of a court that infringes on constitutional rights, that
pursues vague charges, or that allows terrorists to sit in judgment of our citi-
zens. We are all rightly committed to preventing the creation of any such
court. However, the language in this bill does not support any of those results.
All it supports is the establishment of an international court. We strongly fa-
vor that end, and thus support the motion to table the Helms amendment.
Id.
123 "These crimes and these cases would be tried before judges who could be from
North Korea, Cuba, or other unfriendly places." 140 CONG. REC. S96, 101 (daily ed.
Jan. 26, 1994) (statement of Senator Helms).
'24 The "permanent international criminal court to try individuals, potentially includ-
ing American citizens, for such vague crimes as 'colonialism,' or 'environmental
crimes."' Id.
'25 "And yo [sic] may recall with the Genocide Treaty in particular we finally man-
aged to get that through .... We pulled all of its teeth, and it was a toothless tiger
and therefore it has done no damage." S. REP. No. 103-71, at 61-62 (1994).
[Vol. 31:47
FROM NUREMBERG TO ROME
the sovereignty of nations, and the relentless demands of the global
community, ' ' 12o in the interest of preserving the "the sanctity of justice
and the international Rule of Law."'127 The question here, at least in
Senator Helms' terms would be whether a binding international Rule
of Law is at all compatible with the sovereign interests of the United
States.
Senator Helms made no bones about his position, drafting a letter
to Secretary of State Madeline Albright in the spring of 1998, which
stated that the Court treaty would be "dead on arrival" at the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee if the United States did not retain the
power to veto an indictment. 128 Once the treaty conference began,
Senator Helms sent a spokesman, Marc Thiessen, on a surprise fact-
finding mission to the Food and Agricultural Organization in Rome. 129
In a simple statement, Mr. Thiessen reduced Senator Helms' position
to a simple succinct message: "We are not willing to put the United
States up to the justice of the world."'130
After the treaty signing, Senator Helms came out with his strong-
est statement to date. Not only was he opposed to the United States
signing the treaty, but was actively opposed to the very existence of
the court,' 3' and would fight the court's progress. 13
2
126 139 CONG. REc. S889, 931 (daily ed. Jan. 28., 1993) (statement of Senator
Dodd).
'27 Id. at 930.
128 Helms Declares U.N. Criminal Court "Dead-on-Arrival" in Senate Without U.S.
Veto, Gov'T PRESs REL. (Mar. 26,1998), available in 1998 WL 7322525; Helms
told Madeline Albright that he is "unalterably opposed to the creation of a perma-
nent U.N. criminal court because any permanent judiciary within the U.N. system
would be totally inappropriate, insomuch as like the creation of a standing army, or
the power to collect taxes, it would grant the U.N. a principal trapping of sover-
eignty." "The UN," he added, "is not now - nor will it ever be so long as I have
breath in me - a sovereign entity." Id.
129 The U.N. Food and Agricultural Organization served as the site of the Rome Confer-
ence.
130 Helms Vows No "World Justice"for U.S., REUTERS, Jul. 2, 1998.
131 "Rejecting the Rome treaty is not enough. The U.S. must fight the treaty." Jesse
Helms, Personal View: Slay This Monster, FIN. TIMES, Jul. 30, 1998, at 12.
132 For instance, by removing funding and military support, Helms supports keeping U.S.
forces in Germany - "but not if Germany insists on exposing them to the jurisdiction of
the ICC." Id.
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D. Influence from the Pentagon
In addition to the various congressional agendas driving the State
Department, the Pentagon played its own hand at Rome. Here it would
appear that Secretary of Defense William Cohen "absolutely dug in
his heals. ' 33 During the third week of the conference, rumors
abounded134 that Secretary Cohen had, or least that a member of his
staff had, faxed several "talking points" to his German counterparts.
This alleged communiqu6 suggested that if Germany continued to
press against the U.S. position, overseas American troop support, in-
cluding those in Europe, would hang in the balance.' 3 -Though the
Pentagon flatly denied having made such a threat, 136 there was ample
evidence from Senator Helms' office that the U.S. position would now
entail a "re-thinking"1 37 of U.S. overseas defense arrangements, de-
pending on the outcome of the treaty conference.
133 Helle Bering, The Rest of the World's Court, WASH. TIMES, Jul. 30, 1998, at A23.
134 See, e.g., Alessandra Stanley, U.S. Presses Allies to Rein In Proposed War Crimes
Court, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 15, 1998, at A8.
135 See Alessandra Stanley, U.S. Presses Case Against War Court; Two-Thirds of
World Opposes Current Plan, U.N. Conference Is Told, INT'L HERALD TRI., Jul. 16,
1998, at 5, available in LEXIS, News Library, IHT File.
136 Kenneth M. Bacon, DOD News Briefing, M2 PRESSWIRE, Jul. 16, 1998, available
in LEXIS, Market Library, IACNWS file. In a Department of Defense press confer-
ence on Jul. 16, Pentagon spokesman Kenneth Bacon stated, "I can tell you that the
reports about his conversation are flat wrong. [Mr. Cohen] has expressed concerns
about the international criminal court publicly and he has privately, but not in the
terms that have been reported over the last day or so." Id. The State Department, via
James Rubin, had made a similar denial in a press conference the day before:
I think the fact that he didn't say it, means it doesn't reflect the position of the
U.S. government, and that somebody may have written some sentence that
wasn't used. And I can assure you, that happens every day. They write sen-
tences for me all the time that I throw out. And that doesn't constitute Ameri-
can policy, the thrown-out sentences.
James Rubin, State Department Regular Briefing, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, Jul. 15, 1998,
available in LEXIS, News Library, FEDNEW file).
137 "'In theory we will have to renegotiate all our status-of-forces agreements with
every country where we station troops,' said Marc Thiessen, spokesman for Jesse
Helms, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee." Betsey Pisik, World
Criminal Court Created, U.S. Takes Stand, but Loses in Rome, WASH. TIMES, Jul.
18, 1998, at Al; "Indeed, the Clinton administration will now have to renegotiate
our the [sic] status of forces agreements not only with Germany, but with every
other signatory state where American soldiers are stationed. And we must make
clear to these governments that their refusal to do so will force us to reconsider our
ability to station forces on their territory, participate in peacekeeping operations, and
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IV. THE STATUTE AND SUBSTANTIVE U.S. CONCERNS
The fundamental outcome of the Rome convention was very
much in line with the concepts established at Nuremberg. The primary
thrust of the treaty is to establish individual accountability,13 includ-
ing the acceptance of "Superior Orders"1 39 as a defense only when
crimes are not "manifestly unlawful";140 and the responsibility of ci-
vilian and military commanders for the crimes of their subordinates.
14 1
Individual responsibility for war crimes, which flows directly
from Nuremberg, 142 has been repeatedly and openly promoted by the
United States. Important evidence of this embrace can be found in the
text of the U.S. Army Field Manual on the Law of Land Warfare. 143
More recently, the United States (by its Security Council vote) has
affirmed individual responsibility as the proper basis for jurisdiction
in the Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal44 and the Rwandan War
meet our Article Five commitments under the NATO charter." Helms, Slay This
Monster, supra note 131.
138 See Rome Statute, supra note 5, at art. 25 (establishing individual criminal re-
sponsibility).
131 See id. at art. 33 ("Superior Orders and Prescription of Law"). Article 33(2) notes
that, "[f]or the purposes of this article, orders to commit genocide or crimes against
humanity are manifestly unlawful." Id.
140 Id. The authors note that at Nuremberg, Superior Orders was no defense, but
could be considered in mitigation if moral choice was not possible.
141 See Rome Statute, supra note 5, at art. 28 (delineating the responsibilities of
military commanders and other supervisors).
142 See Principles of International Law, supra note 15, at 11-14 (discussing the
Nuremberg Principles).
143 Sections 510 and 511 of the U.S. Army Field Manual specifically recognize the
lack of a defense for government officials for such crimes. U.S. DEP'T OF THE
ARMY, FIELD MANUAL, supra note 73. Section 498 states that:
Any person, whether a member of the armed forces or a civilian, who commits
an act which constitutes a crime under international law is responsible there-
fore and liable to punishment. Such connection with war compromise: a.
Crimes against peace.; b. Crimes against humanity.; and c. War crimes. Al-
though this manual recognizes the criminal responsibility of individuals for
those offenses which may comprise any of the foregoing types of crimes,
members of the armed forces will normally be concerned only with those of-
fenses constitutes 'war crimes.'
Id. at 178.
144 "The Security Council has reaffirmed on several occasions that persons who
commit or order the commission of grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions
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Crimes Tribunal. 145 Thus, at least this central concept of the court
would seem to be in line with stated U.S. concepts of international
law.
in the territory of the former Yugoslavia are individually responsible for such
breaches as serious violations of international humanitarian law." United Nations:
Secretary-General's Report on Aspects of Establishing an International Tribunalfor
the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Hu-
manitarian Law Committed in the Territory Of The Former Yugoslavia, 32 I.L.M.
1159, 1171 (1993).
'45 Article 6 of the Rwandan Statute echoes the Nuremberg definitions of individual
responsibility:
A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and
abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in arti-
cles 2 to 4 of the present Statute, shall be individually responsible for the
crime.
The official position of any accused person, whether as Head of State or Gov-
ernment or as a responsible Government official, shall not relieve such person
of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment.
United Nations: Security Council Resolution 955 Establishing the International
Tribunal for Rwanda, 33 I.L.M. 1598, 1604 (1994). Articles 2 of the Yugoslav
tribunal statute and Article 4 of the Rwandan statute lay out an extensive list of
criminal bases for bringing an indictment (far broader than either Nuremberg or the
proposed ICC). Article 2 of the Yugoslav statute includes:
wilful killing;
torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments;
wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health;
extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military
necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly;
compelling a prisoner of war or a civilian to serve in the forces of a hostile
power;
willfully depriving a prisoner of war or a civilian of the rights of fair and
regular trial;
unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a civilian; and
taking civilians as hostages.
32 I.L.M., at 1609.
Article 4 of the Rwandan statute includes:
Violence to life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in par-
ticular murder as well as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or any
form of corporal punishment;
[Vol. 31:47
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A. Jurisdiction
The basic jurisdiction of the ICC is limited to the "most serious
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole,"' 146 and
more specifically limited to (a) the crime of genocide; (b) crimes
against humanity; (c) war crimes; and (d) the crime of aggression. 14
7
The court will have automatic jurisdiction for genocide and crimes
against humanity for states that ratify the ICC.
148
A number of specifics are elaborated in the statute, drawing from
the brutal litany of egregious acts that individuals have committed un-
Collective punishments;
Taking of hostages;
Acts of terrorism;
Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading
treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault;
Pillage;
The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous
judgement pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judi-
cial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples;
and
Threats to commit any of the foregoing acts.
33 I.L.M. 1598, 1604 (1994).
146 Rome Statute, supra note 5, at art. 5 ("Crimes within the jurisdiction of the
Court").
147 See id. The inclusion of aggression was hotly debated, despite its central role in
the Nuremberg trials and the growing consensus of what acts define aggression. For
now, Article 5 specifies that the Court's jurisdiction over the crime of aggression
will not begin until a provision is adopted at a later date by a 7/8th majority of the
treaty's signatories. See id. arts. 5 & 121(4). The Final Act states that:
The Commission shall prepare proposals for a provision on aggression, in-
cluding the definition and Elements of Crimes of aggression and the condi-
tions under which the International Criminal Court shall exercise its jurisdic-
tion with regard to this crime. The Commission shall submit such proposals to
the Assembly of States Parties at a Review Conference, with a view to arriv-
ing at an acceptable provision on the crime of aggression for inclusion in this
Statute. The provisions relating to the crime of aggression shall enter into
force for the States Parties in accordance with the relevant provisions of this
Statute.
The Final Act, supra note 5, at art. 7.
148 Rome Statute, supra note 5, arts. 5, 12(1).
CASE W. RES. J INT'L L.
der military campaigns during this century. For instance, rape, forced
pregnancy and forced sterilization are listed as both crimes against
humanityT49 and war crimes. 150 It is interesting to note that even this
new recognition of gender-specific crimes as falling under universal
jurisdiction has been proposed in the U.S. Congress.
B. Trigger Mechanisms
Perhaps the most controversial issue at Rome was the proposal
for a proprio motu152 Prosecutor. Despite the best efforts on the part
of the United States to persuade 153 (then ultimately perform an end-
149 Article 7 also includes "[r]ape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced
pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of compara-
ble gravity." Id. art 7(1)(g). Article 7 further provides that "'forced pregnancy'
means the unlawful confinement, of a woman forcibly made pregnant, with the in-
tent of affecting the ethnic composition of any population or carrying out other
grave violations of international law. This definition shall not in any way be inter-
preted as affecting national laws relating to pregnancy." Id. at art. 7(2)(f).
150 Article 8(2)(b)(xxii) includes as a war crime "committing rape, sexual slavery,
enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, as defined in Article 7, paragraph 2 (f),
enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence also constituting a grave
breach of the Geneva Conventions." Id. at art. 8(2)(b)(xxii).
151 For instance, § 758 of the 1994 Foreign Relations Authorization proposed that
forced sterilization should serve as a mandatory basis for providing sanctuary to
Chinese nationals, stating that "the Attorney General shall protect from deportation
or exclusion to the People's Republic of China nationals of the People's Republic of
China who demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that they will be forced to abort a
pregnancy or will be subjected to forced sterilization under Chinese Communist
Party directives and/or government directives of the People's Republic of China on
population or will suffer other severe harm for refusal to comply with such direc-
tives, or who demonstrate that they have experienced severe harm on account of
their refusal to comply with such directives." 140 CONG. REc. 559 (1994). How-
ever, the final enactment completely omits this section, retaining instead a general
treatment of China's MFN status with the United States. Pub. L. No. 103-236, 108
Stat 382 (1994).
152 "On one's own initiative," WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1154 (1983).
153 See Rubin, Self-Initiating Prosecutor, supra note 114. Rubin stated that:
It is our firm view that proposals for a self-initiating prosecutor complicate
and perhaps compromise the prosecutor's central mandate - investigating
thoroughly those crimes of most concern to the international community:
genocide, crimes against humanity and the most serious war crimes. The
prosecutor's office must not become a human rights ombudsman responsive to
any and all complaints. Doing so will only flood the Court's docket, hinder its
investigations into the most serious crimes, create controversy over the outer
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run around) the states friendly to this idea, Article 15 of the statute
provides for an independent prosecutor who can act on complaints by
State Parties154 or upon information tendered via NGOs, intergovern-
mental organizations or, presumably, even individuals. 15  The major
provision added to allay the fears of the United States 56 and others
that the Prosecutor might be overwhelmed with frivolous or overly
politicized suits, was the inclusion of a Pre-Trial Chamber to author-
ize investigations, 157 which provides a critical check on the actions of
the Prosecutor. The issue lost by the United States here was manda-
tory approval by the Security Council or home state consent for all
pending indictments.1 58 Instead, the Security Council can refer cases
limits of the Court's jurisdiction, and undermine the core consensus and inter-
national support that is essential to an effective Court.
Id.
154 See Rome Statute, supra note 5, at art. 14.
155 Article 15(2) requires that:
[T]he Prosecutor shall analyse the seriousness of the information received. For
this purpose, he or she may seek additional information from States, organs of
the United Nations, intergovernmental or non-governmental organizations, or
other reliable sources that he or she deems appropriate, and may receive writ-
ten or oral testimony at the seat of the Court.
Id. at art. 15(2).
156 See Rubin, Self-Initiating Prosecutor, supra note 114. "If neither the Security
Council nor any state endorses action by the Court, the prosecutor would act without
a critical and essential base of international consensus." Id.
157 Article 15(4) provides that:
If the Pre-Trial Chamber, upon examination of the request and the supporting
material, considers that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investi-
gation, and that the case appears to fall within the jurisdiction of the Court, it
shall authorize the commencement of the investigation, without prejudice to
subsequent determinations by the Court with regard to the jurisdiction and
admissibility of a case.
Rome Statute, supra note 5, at art. 15(4).
158 Article 6 of the conference draft proposed that:
[T]he Court [may exercise its] [shall have] jurisdiction [over a person] with
respect to a crime referred to in article 5, paragraph [(a) to (e), or any combi-
nation thereof] [and in accordance with the provisions of this Statute] if: [(a)
the [matter] [situation] is referred to the Court by the Security Council, [in
accordance with article 10] [acting under Chapter VII of the Charter];]
United Nations Diplomatic Conference, supra note 117, at 30.
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to the Prosecutor, 159 and can withhold cases for a year if a consensus
can be reached among the permanent five members of the Council
under Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter. 160 Therefore, while approval by
the Security Council is not a requisite for prosecution, there is still a
significant check in place for cases where the Security Council be-
lieves that prosecution is either premature or unwise.
In an attempt to satisfy the predominantly U.S. desire for home
state ratification for prosecutions, consent of the territorial state where
the crimes were committed or the state of nationality of the accused,
but not the custodial state, is required for prosecution of core
crimes. 16 1 Also, internal armed conflict was included, with a broad
array of criminal acts elaborated in the statute. 162 Further, States are
159 See Rome Statute, supra note 5, at art. 13(b). The authors note that these use the
same Article VII powers upon which the Yugoslav and Rwandan War Crimes Tri-
bunals were established.
'60 Article 16, "Deferral of Investigation or Prosecution," provides that:
No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under
this Statute for a period of 12 months after the Security Council, in a resolu-
tion adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has re-
quested the Court to that effect; that request may be renewed by the Council
under the same conditions.
Id. at art. 16.
161 See id. at art. 12 ("Preconditions to the Exercise of Jurisdiction").
162 Article 8(2)(e) includes:
(e) Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed con-
flicts not of an international character, within the established framework of in-
ternational law, namely, any of the following acts:
i. Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such
or against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities;
ii. Intentionally directing attacks against buildings, material, medical
units and transport, and personnel using the distinctive emblems of
the Geneva Conventions in conformity with international law;
iii. Intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations, mate-
rial, units or vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance or peace-
keeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,
as long as they are entitled to the protection given to civilians or civil-
ian objects under the law of armed conflict;
iv. Intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion,
education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic monuments,
hospitals and places where the sick and wounded are collected, pro-
vided they are not military objectives;
v. Pillaging a town or place, even when taken by assault;
[Vol. 31:47
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able to withhold cooperation on grounds of national security, 163 upon
application to the Pre-Trial Chamber 64 Thus the Statute provides a
number of clear protections against self-interested abuses on the part
of the independent prosecutor.
Still, the primary bases for challenge presented by the United
States were fears that 1) the staff (judges and prosecutor) of the court
would not operate impartially; and 2) that frivolous claims would be
brought on the basis of political animus against the United States
C. Complementarity
In order for the court to operate in accordance with critical na-
tional sovereignty requirements, it must serve a complementary role
vi. Committing rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced preg-
nancy, as defined in Article 7, paragraph 2 (f), enforced sterilization,
and any other form of sexual violence also constituting a serious vio-
lation of article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions;
vii. Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into
armed forces or groups or using them to participate actively in hostili-
ties;
viii. Ordering the displacement of the civilian population for reasons re-
lated to the conflict, unless the security of the civilians involved or
imperative military reasons so demand;
ix. Killing or wounding treacherously a combatant adversary;
x. Declaring that no quarter will be given;
xi. Subjecting persons who are in the power of another party to the con-
flict to physical mutilation or to medical or scientific experiments of
any kind which are neither justified by the medical, dental or hospital
treatment of the person concerned nor carried out in his or her inter-
est, and which cause death to or seriously endanger the health of such
person or persons;
xii. Destroying or seizing the property of an adversary unless such de-
struction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of
the conflict.
Id. at art. 8(2)(e).
163 See id. at art. 72 (providing for protection of national security information).
"4 Article 57(2)(a) states that "[o]rders or rulings of the Pre-Trial Chamber... must
be concurred in by a majority of its judges." Id. art 57(2)(a). Article 57(3)(c) states
that, "[w]here necessary, [the Pre-Trial Chamber may] provide for the protection
and privacy of victims and witnesses, the preservation of evidence, the protection of
persons who have been arrested or appeared in response to a summons, and the pro-
tection of national security information." Id. at art. 57(3)(c).
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in the prosecution of international criminals. 165 The complementarity
regime of the statute is the most targeted response to state sovereignty
concerns. Under the complementarity provisions in Article 18, the
prosecutor will notify states (confidentially, if appropriate) 166 of the
pending investigation. Within one month of such notice, the notified
state may request that the investigation be deferred, 167 pending its own
investigation, 168 and subject to a six-month review by the prosecutor.
This mechanism allows each state to conduct its own investigation,
and provides that the Prosecutor of the ICC may not intervene unless
such states are "unwilling' 69 or genuinely unable"'170 to prosecute the
case. 171 Further, following a U.S. proposal, states can challenge the
admissibility of a case "at the earliest opportunity.'
172
165 "We want to ensure, however, that an international criminal court complements
national investigations and prosecutions and does not undermine them. That is why
we have been deeply engaged in discussions at the U.N. this year to examine key
issues relating to a statute for such a court and to protect the legitimate law en-
forcement interests of the United States." U.S. Department of State, Speech: Made-
line Albright, Enforcing International Law (June 15, 1995). Then U.N. Ambassador
Albright spoke before the Philadelphia Bar Association under the auspices of the
Bureau of International Organization Affairs. (visited on Aug 1, 1998) Available at
<http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/> (document search of state department archives for
"Philadelphia Bar Association" and "Albright" and "1993").
166 See Rome Statute, supra note 5, at art. 18(1).
167 See id. at art. 18(2) ("[a]t the request of that State, the Prosecutor shall defer to
the State's investigation of those persons unless the Pre-Trial Chamber, on the ap-
plication of the Prosecutor, decides to authorize the investigation").
'6' See id.
169 Despite the logical and historically supported concern presented by most states
that a nation might fail to prosecute its own nationals, the State Department contin-
ued to press for home state consent. "The United States rejects the notion that states
will fail to respond to atrocities." Rubin, Self-Initiating Prosecutor, supra note 114.
170 Rome Statute, supra note 5, at art. 17.
Our long-term vision is the prevention of heinous crimes through effective na-
tional law enforcement buttressed by the deterrence of a permanent court. The
court must ensure that national legal systems with the will and ability to exer-
cise jurisdiction are permitted to do so, and the court should act when na-
tional legal systems fail.
Rubin, Establishing International Court, supra note 66 (emphasis added).
171 See Rome Statute, supra note 5, at art. 17(1) ("Issues of Admissibility"). This
article provides that:
[T[he Court shall determine that a case is inadmissible where: (a) The case is
being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, un-
less the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or
[Vol. 31:47
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D. Protections for the Accused
A major part of the U.S. criticism of the statute is that it would be
"unconstitutional." Certainly, there is no presumption that the United
States (by means of advice and consent) may not bind itself by treaty
to supra-nationally cooperative ventures. The assumption, then, would
be that somehow subjecting U.S. nationals to the jurisdiction of the
court would be violative of constitutional Procedural Due Process
guarantees.
To be sure, due process is a fundamental element of an interna-
tional Rule of Law,17 but one must query whether the Rule of Law
means that U.S. constitutional standards must be adopted by the rest
of the world, or whether generally accepted principles of just treat-
ment will not both suffice and promote a greater respect for the court.
A major debate in this area was whether the court would try de-
fendants in absentia. 174 In response to this, the statute provides that the
or prosecution; (b) The case has been investigated by a State which has juris-
diction over it and the State has decided not to prosecute the person con-
cerned, unless the decision resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the
State genuinely to prosecute; (c) The person concerned has already been tried
for conduct which is the subject of the complaint, and a trial by the Court is
not permitted under article 20, paragraph 3; (d) The case is not of sufficient
gravity to justify further action by the Court.
Id.
12 Id. at art. 19(5). Note that a challenge can also be brought by "[a] State from
which acceptance of jurisdiction is required under article 12." Id. at art. 19(2)(c).
173 Indeed, in the Trial of Joseph Alstiitter & Ors, UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES
COMMISSION, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 103 (1948), the War
Crimes Tribunal established minimum criteria in the subsequent proceedings by
which a criminal trial would operate according to the Rule of Law if:
i) the right of accused persons to know the charge against them, and this is a
reasonable time before the opening of trial, was denied; ii) the right of ac-
cused to full aid of counsel, of their own choice was denied, and sometimes no
counsel at all was allowed to defend the accused; iii) the right to be tried by an
unprejudiced judge was denied to accused persons; iv) the right of the accused
to give or introduce evidence was wholly or partially denied; v) the right of
the accused to know the evidence against them was denied; vi) The general
right to a hearing adequate for a full investigation of the case was denied.
Id.
174 At Nuremberg, Martin Bormann was tried in absentia. The Nuremberg Charter
did not require his pregence at trial.
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defendant must be present in order for the trial to proceed. 175 Further,
the accused may appeal the decision of the court based on challenges
to the substantive outcome, procedural application, or unfairness of
the sentence imposed. 1
76
The death penalty was not included as an option for the court. 17 7
Also, the maximum sentence is thirty years, 178 although a life sentence
is permitted in extreme cases, 179 and the sentence will be enforced
voluntarily by the member states, 180 or, if necessary, in the Nether-
lands at the Court's expense. 18' Meanwhile, the court will strictly con-
trol both the sentence and parole.
182
In addition to the requirement that the accused be present during
trial, there are numerous American-style provisions designed to pro-
tect an accused from mistreatment in the statute. These include a pre-
sumption of innocence, 183 a right to avoid self incrimination, 184 and a
175 See Rome Statute, supra note 5, at art. 63 ("Trial in the presence of the ac-
cused").
176 See id. at art. 81 ("Appeal against decision of acquittal or conviction or against
sentence").
177 See UNITED NATIONS DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE, supra note 117, at 121. Pro-
posed in Article 75 of the conference draft: "[(e) (Death penalty)] Option 1 [death
penalty, as an option, in case of aggravating circumstances and when the Trial
Chamber finds it necessary in the light of the gravity of the crime, the number of
victims, and the severity of the damage]." Id. (brackets in original).
178 See Rome Statute, supra note 5, at art. 77(1)(a) ("Applicable penalties").
17' Article 77(1)(b) states that "[the Court may impose] a term of life imprisonment
when justified by the extreme gravity of the crime and the individual circumstances
of the convicted person." Id. at art. 77(1)(b).
180 See Rome Statute, supra note 5, at art. 103(1)(a) (Role of States in enforcement
of sentences of imprisonment).
181 See id. at art. 3. See also Id. at art. 103(4).
[1]f no State is designated under paragraph 1, the sentence of imprisonment
shall be served in a prison facility made available by the host State, in accor-
dance with the conditions set out in the headquarters agreement referred to in
article 3, paragraph 2. In such a case, the costs arising out of the enforcement
of a sentence of imprisonment shall be borne by the Court.
Id. at art. 103(4).
182 See id. at art. 110. Article 110(1) requires that "the State of enforcement shall not
release the person before expiry of the sentence pronounced by the Court." Id. at art.
110(1).
183 See id. at art. 66(1) ("Presumption of innocence").
1' See id. at art. 55(1)(a) ("Rights of person during an investigation").
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prosecutorial burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.185
An accused has the right to remain silent "without such silence being
a consideration in the determination of guilt or innocence," during
investigation, 186 as well as during the trial, 7 An accused has the right
to be questioned in the presence of counsel unless they have voluntar-
ily waived such right.188 Article 67 also provides a full set of protec-
tions during the trial, designed to ensure that the process is conducted
fairly and effectively. 189 Perhaps the only U.S.-style provision not
contemplated by the statute is a jury trial. 90
185 See Rome Statute, supra note 5, at art. 66(2) and (3) ("Presumption of inno-
cence").
6 See id. at art. 55(2)(b).
187 See id. at art. 67(1)(g).
18 See id. at art. 55(2)(d); Article 55(2)(c) provides the right
[T]o have legal assistance of the person's choosing, or, if the person does not
have legal assistance, to have legal assistance assigned to him or her, in any
case where the interests of justice so require, and without payment by the per-
son in any such case if the person does not have sufficient means to pay for it.
Id. at art. 55(2)(c).
189 Id. at art. 67.
In the determination of any charge, the accused shall be entitled to a public
hearing, having regard to the provisions of this Statute, to a fair hearing con-
ducted impartially, and to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality.
(a) To be informed promptly and in detail of the nature, cause and content of
the charge, in a language which the accused fully understands and speaks; (b)
To have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the defence [sic]
and to communicate freely with counsel of the accused's [sic] choosing in
confidence; (c) To be tried without undue delay; (d) Subject to article 63,
paragraph 2, to be present at the trial, to conduct the defence [sic] in person or
through legal assistance of the accused's [sic] choosing, to be informed, if the
accused does not have legal assistance, of this right and to have legal assis-
tance assigned by the Court in any case where the interests of justice so re-
quire, and without payment if the accused lacks sufficient means to pay for
it;(e) To examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him or her and to
obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his or her behalf under
the same conditions as witnesses against him or her. The accused shall also be
entitled to raise defences [sic] and to present other evidence admissible under
this Statute; (f) To have, free of any cost, the assistance of a competent inter-
preter and such translations as are necessary to meet the requirements of fair-
ness, if any of the proceedings of or documents presented to the Court are not
in a language which the accused fully understands and speaks; (g) Not to be
compelled to testify or to confess guilt and to remain silent, without such si-
lence being a consideration in the determination of guilt or innocence; (h) To
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As regards the substance to be applied by the court, the guaran-
tees and provisions of the statute are exceptional in their conciseness
and embrace of the proper role of the court. The first of these provi-
sions, nullum crimen sine lege19 1 requires that 1) an accused may be
charged only with a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court, 2) ap-
plicable law is to be strictly construed by the court. 192 The second
provision, nulla poena sine lege 193 limits punishment to the provisions
of the statute.
Beyond providing a strict legal basis for prosecution, these arti-
cles set an important limitation on the court - it does not re-define
international law, 194 rather, it positively applies international law as
established by the laws, treaties and customs of the world. 195
make an unsworn [sic] oral or written statement in his or her defence [sic];
and (i) Not to have imposed on him or her any reversal of the burden of proof
or any onus of rebuttal.
Id.
'90 See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT, S. REP. 103-71, at 115 (1993).
Because the jury system as it is employed in the United States is basically un-
known to the civil law world, it is likely that only trial by the court would be
feasible. Also, the impracticability of attempting to empanel a jury before an
international criminal court would seem an insurmountable obstacle to its use.
Id.
[I]f [an] action must be tried under the auspices of an Article II court, then
the Seventh Amendment affords the parties a right to a jury trial whenever the
cause of action is legal in nature. Conversely, if Congress may assign the ad-
judication of a statutory cause of action to a non-Article III tribunal, then the
Seventh Amendment poses no independent bar to the adjudication of that ac-
tion by a nonjury factfinder.
Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 53-54 (1989).
191 Literally, "no crime without a corresponding law." See Rome Statute, supra note
5, at art. 22.
'92 See id. at art. 22(2) (providing that "the definition of a crime shall be strictly
construed and shall not be extended by analogy. In case of ambiguity, the definition
shall be interpreted in favour of the person being investigated, prosecuted or con-
victed").
193 Literally, "no punishment without legal basis." See id. at art. 23.
194 See id. at art. 22(3) (stating that the articles "shall not affect the characterization
of any conduct as criminal under international law independently of this Statute").
195 See id. at art. 21.
Article 21 Applicable Law:
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E. The United States Position Does Not Hold the Day
One might think that the number of creative concessions made to
accommodate U.S. concerns about the court would have led to a stat-
ute acceptable by all. However, it became clear early in the negotia-
tions that goals expressed on key issues by the coalition of "friendly
nations" and those expressed by the United States would not be com-
patible - regardless of concessions made during the negotiations.
The resulting rift left the United States isolated, and ultimately in po-
sition of irretrievable opposition to the court.
Interestingly enough, individuals and NGOs 196  ultimately
stemmed the tide of U.S. influence and created the strongest bulwark
against the pressure and alleged threats tendered by the U.S. delega-
tion and the Pentagon. Without this influence, it is not at all clear that
the delegations at Rome would have reached sufficient level of con-
sensus to produce a treaty which would have any force.
1. The Court shall apply: (a) In the first place, this Statute, Elements of
Crimes and its Rules of Procedure and Evidence; (b) In the second place,
where appropriate, applicable treaties and the principles and rules of in-
ternational law, including the established principles of the international
law of armed conflict; (c) Failing that, general principles of law derived
by the Court from national laws of legal systems of the world including,
as appropriate, the national laws of States that would normally exercise
jurisdiction over the crime, provided that those principles are not incon-
sistent with this Statute and with international law and internationally
recognized norms and standards.
2. The Court may apply principles and rules of law as interpreted in its
previous decisions.
3. The application and interpretation of law pursuant to this article must be
consistent with internationally recognized human rights, and be without
any adverse distinction founded on grounds such as gender, as defined in
Article 7, paragraph 3, age, race, colour, language, religion or belief, po-
litical or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, wealth, birth or
other status.
Id.
196 For example, the Committee of Former Nuremberg Prosecutors participated in
the Rome conference and the Preparatory Conferences leading up to Rome. Com-
mittee members Henry King and Ben Ferencz attended opening and closing ceremo-
nies and committee coordinator Whitney Harris attended intervening sessions work-
ing with the German and other delegations for the successful inclusion of aggressive
war as a core crime.
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The major roles played by NGOs during the conference were: in-
fluence via working groups;197 keeping unofficial tallies of delegation
positions on key issues; 1 8 and publicizing conference progress on a
nearly daily basis. 199 The effect of the NGOs at the conference was
remarkable. National delegations (and the world) remained well-
informed as final positions began to emerge, and the well-organized
and extremely professional efforts of the NGOs kept the conference
focussed on the key issues that would needed to be resolved in order
for consensus to be reached.
In addition to the incredibly effective efforts of the NGOs a num-
ber of individuals were able to keep the conference moving in a direc-
tion that made the conference outcome sustainable and meaningful. In
particular, Phillipe Kirsch200 and M. Cherif Bassiouni 20 deserve he-
197 A major role played by the Coalition for an International Criminal court was the
central coordination of conference activities. This was accomplished by selecting
delegates from NGOs present at the conference to monitor the conference progress
on key issues. NGO teams included: "Definitions," "State Consent," "Trigger
Mechanism and Admissibility," "General Principles," "Composition," "Investiga-
tion," "Trial," "Appeal and Review," "Penalties," "Cooperation & National Secu-
rity," "Enforcement," "Financing & Assembly of State Parties," and "Final
Clauses." Each team had an established agenda and reported back regularly to the
Coalition during the course of the conference. Rome CICC Italy Conference, Re-
ports on the Rome Conference and Other Documents (visited Oct. 19, 1998)
<http://www.igc.apc.org/icc/rome/html/romeother.html>.
198 In particular, a report issued over the Internet on Jul. 10, 1998 (roughly two
weeks before the treaty signing) outlined the level of support for the numerous op-
tions presented in the draft statute. See NGO Coalition Special Report on Country
Positions, The Numbers (visited Oct. 19, 1998) <gopher://gopher.igc.org/
00/orgs/icc/ngodocs/ rome/numbers.txt>.
199 NGO groups published short newsletters which were printed and distributed at
the conference, published on the Internet, and available via e-mail list server. The
two most consistent of these were On the Record "conceived by The Advocacy Pro-
ject, an informal association that seeks to promote respect for humanitarianism...
[and] supported by the Coalition for an International Criminal Court (CICC) and
the Washington-based Coalition for International Justice," <http://www.advo-
cacynet.org>, and Terra Viva, published by the IPS - Interpress service,
<http://www.ips.org/icc/>.
o Due to a regrettable illness, Adriaan Boos, the highly effective chairman of the
preparatory sessions, was unable to attend the Rome conference. In his place, Phil-
lipe Kirsch of Canada served as conference chairman. Mr. Kirsch did an out-
standing job of building consensus among the "like-minded" countries and bravely
held out against U.S. pressure to derail the conference.
201 Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni of the DePaul University College of Law attended
the conference as a delegate of Egypt and headed up the drafting committee. The
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roes' laurels for their ability to achieve results at Rome. Rome was a
place for individuals to stand up and be heard, and these two, along
with many others, made the most of this pivotal moment. The portion
of the world which supports the establishment of this court owes them
a debt of gratitude.
The best testimony to the work done by the NGOs and the indi-
viduals in favor of the court at Rome was their ability to withstand the
final efforts of the United States to influence the outcome of the con-
ference. While the U.S. delegation had maintained a fairly construc-
tive and conciliatory tone throughout the initial weeks of the confer-
ence, it "laid down its cards" eight days before the end of the confer-
ence. On July 9 th, David Scheffer let the rest of the delegations know
that the United States did not intend to alter its opposition to a court
which did not require state consent and security council ratification of
indictments.202 He further stressed an unwillingness to confer auto-
matic jurisdiction upon the court for more than the crime of geno-
cide.203 Despite the ire this provoked among other nations and
NGOs, 20 4 the United States continued to press its opposition, urging
the rest of the delegates to simultaneously consider how much the
United States could help a court it favored, and how much it could
impede a court which failed to meet its objectives. 205
authors note that his list of credentials includes: President, International Human
Rights Law Institute, DePaul University; President, International Association of
Penal Law; President, International Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences;
Vice-Chairman, United Nations Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court; Former Chairman, Commission of Experts Established
by the Security Council to Investigate Violations of International Humanitarian Law
in the Former Yugoslavia. Mr. Bassiouni's contributions to the establishment of the
court seem limitless. He has authored treatises, texts, and numerous law review
articles on the subject of international crime. Further, he authored the original draft
Court Statute for the ILC and testified before Congress in support of the Court. See
139 CoNG. REc. S10773 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1993) (statement of Professor Bassiouni,
as corrected by Senator Dodd). Only a man with such a deep and illustrious in-
volvement in the creation of a regime of international criminal law could have suc-
cessfully guided the Rome drafting committee to such a workable and effective out-
come in such a short period of time.
M U.S. Lays Down its Cards, T;RRAVIVA, Jul. 10, 1998 (visited Aug. 1, 1998)
<http:llwww.ips.org/icc/tvlOO702.htm>.
203 Id.
204 See What a Letdown!, TERRAVIVA, Jul. 10, 1998 (visited Aug. 1, 1998)
<http://www.ips.org/icc/tvl0070l.htm>.
205 See U.S. Speak [sic] More Softly, TERRAVIvA, Jul. 7, 1998, (visited Aug. 1,
1998) <http:llwww.ips.org/icc/tv160704.htm>.
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In response to the U.S. efforts to sway the clear majority, Phillipe
Kirsch made two very effective moves. First, he forced the committee
of the whole to make its final recommendations by July 15 th at noon,
quelling the desire to extend the negotiations. 0 6 Second, he held off
on introducing the final draft statute until July 16 th (the day before the
conference ended), forcing a vote on a single proposal. 0 7
The end result was surprising and impressive. In the face of con-
siderable resistance from the United States, 120 nations voted for a
treaty that was very much not in line with stated U.S. objectives.
V. SUBSTANCE AND FUSION
In the aftermath of the Statute's adoption, the United States
stands alone as the one great power unwilling to contribute to the in-
stitutionalization of international criminal law through an independent
International Criminal Court. U.S. challenges to the substance of the
court are generalized, politicized, and lack a proper grounding in both
domestic and international law. Rather than try to guide its allies to a
mutually acceptable compromise, which would allow it to both pro-
mote an international Rule of Law20 8 and protect its nationals, the
United States has declared the court dangerous and defunct.
The end result of the Rome conference was perhaps as positive as
any stalwart pragmatist could hope for. Genocide, War Crimes, and
2 High Noon, TERRAVIVA, Jul. 15, 1998, (visited Aug. 1, 1998)
<http://www.ips.org/icc/tv150701.htm>.
207 And They Took It, TERRAVIVA, Jul. 18, 1998 (visited Aug. 1, 1998)
<http://www.ips.org/icc/tv180701.htm>.
208 The very concept of a Rule of Law implies the dynamic at play here. Somewhere
along a continuum of Power and Law, a middle ground must be reached and one end
of the spectrum informs the other as to just and effective operation of society -
either national or international. See, e.g., The Meaning of the Rule of Law in GEOF-
FREY DE. Q. WALKER, THE RULE OF LAW, FOUNDATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL DE-
MOCRACY, 1-48 (Melbourne University Press 1988), suggesting a "Twelve-Point
Institutional Definition" of the Rule of Law, consisting of 1) Laws against private
coercion; 2) Government under law; 3) Certainty, generality, equality; 4) General
congruence of law with social values; 5) Enforcement of laws against private coer-
cion; 6) Enforcement of government under law principle; 7) Independence of the
Judiciary; 8) Independent legal profession; 9) Natural justice, impartial tribunals;
10) Accessibility of courts; 11) Impartial and honest enforcement; and 12) An atti-
tude of legality. All of these organize under the rubric that 1) people (including the
government) should be ruled by the law and obey it and 2) that the law should be
such that the people will be able (and willing) to be guided by it. At a minimum,
these general parameters stress the importance of institutional independence, estab-
lished laws, and enforcement.
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Crimes Against Humanity were passed with language that both echoes
well-established twentieth century traditions and acknowledges les-
sons learned during recent decades. The crime of Aggression was in-
cluded, though the definition was left to a later date, at which point a
7/8 th majority will be needed to pass the amendment. In reviewing the
substantive outcome of Rome, it is difficult to see where the new
court will either violate generally accepted concepts of criminal law
or impose an unacceptable infringement on national sovereignty.
F. Mr. Scheffer Comes Home
Upon his return to Washington, Mr. Scheffer sat before a special
hearing of the International Operations subcommittee of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee. At this hearing, the U.S. position was
presented more clearly than ever. 20 9 Senators Helms and Grams made
it clear that they must challenge the jurisdiction of the court,2 1° should
it come into existence, and Senator Helms went so far as to challenge
the validity of universal jurisdiction,21 crediting the German delega-
2 See generally id.; "I hope that now the Administration will actively oppose this
Court to make sure that it shares the same fate as the League of Nations - and col-
lapses without U.S. support. For this Court truly is a monster, and it is a monster
that must be slain." Hearing on The United Nations International Criminal Court,
Federal Document Clearing House, Jul. 23, 1998 available in 1998 WL 12762521.
[hereinafter Hearing on United Nations International Criminal Court] (statement of
Senator Rod Grams).
210 "While I am relieved that the Administration voted against the treaty in Rome -
I am convinced that is not - in itself - sufficient to safeguard our nation's inter-
ests. The United States must aggressively oppose this Court each step of the way,
because the treaty establishing the International Criminal Court is not just bad, it is
dangerous." Id.
211 See Hearing on the United Nations International Criminal Court, supra note 209
(statement of Senator Jesse Helms).
You see, the delegates in Rome included a form of "universal jurisdiction" in
the Court statute. This means that, even if the U.S. never signs the treaty, and
even if the U.S. Senate refuses to ratify it, the countries participating in this
Court will regard American soldiers and citizens to be within the jurisdiction
of the International Criminal Court. That, Mr. Chairman, is nonsense, and it
is an outrage that it will have grave consequences for our bilateral relations
with every single country that signs and ratifies this treaty. Now, I understand
that Germany was the intellectual author of this universal jurisdiction provi-
sion. Mr. Chairman, we have thousands of American soldiers stationed in
Germany today. Will the German government now consider those American
forces under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court?
1999]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'LL.
tion with the invention of this form of jurisdiction. Senator Helms
went on to discuss the crime of aggression as a new and capricious
attempt to reign in U.S.' unilateral actions such as Grenada, Panama,
and Tripoli - completely ignoring or at least temporarily forgetting
the central role played by the United States in defining aggression as
the ultimate crime at Nuremberg.212 The coup de grdce came from
Senator Grams, who seemed to indicate that the United States would
block investigation and enforcement action by the court2 13 - directly
shunning the United States' state responsibility to assist in the prose-
cution of international criminals under the Geneva conventions and
under customary international law. 214
One must speculate whether Mr. Scheffer, who finds himself now
thoroughly embraced by the more conservative members of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee knew at all what he was getting into.
Time will tell whether his silence and lack of rebuttal during his post-
conference examination at the hearing indicate tacit agreement, or a
212 U.S. Courts have resisted recognition of aggression as a universal crime.
D'Amato, Gould & Woods, War Crimes and Vietnam: The 'Nuremberg Defense'
and the Military Service Resister, 57 CAL. L. REV. 1055, 1061-63 (1969).
213 Senator Grams reminds us that the United States is willing to go its own way
when international law does not suit U.S. Foreign Policy.
A decision by the International Criminal Court to prosecute Americans for
military actions wouldn't be the first time that an international court tried to
undercut our pursuit of our national security interests. In 1984 the World
Court ordered the U.S. to respect Nicaragua's borders and halt the mining of
its harbors by the CIA. In 1986 the World Court found our country guilty of
violations of international law through its support of the Contras and ordered
the payment of reparation to Nicaragua. Needless to say we ignored both rul-
ings.
Hearing on the United Nations International Criminal Court, supra note 209
(statement of Senator Rod Grams). Senator Grams is referring to Nicaragua v. U.S.
See Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua
(Nicaragua v. United States of America), 1986 I.C.J. 4 (June 27). Though the ICJ
ultimately found breaches of Article 3 of the Geneva Convention of 1946 in the ac-
tions of the United States, one must ask whether an ICC indictment against a U.S.
war criminal would actually be shunned by the U.S. government.
214 Indeed, such obstruction may, in itself, be actionable before the court. Article 70
describes as a cause of action: "(d) Impeding, intimidating or corruptly influencing
an official of the Court for the purpose of forcing or persuading the official not to
perform, or to perform improperly, his or her duties." See Rome Statute, supra note
5, at art. 70.
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belief that he can enter and exit the conservative camp with trivial ef-
fort.21
5
Beyond speculation by Senators Helms and Grams that the court
will not, should not, and must not come into existence,216 the review
of the legal substance of the court statute was left to the lone court
protagonist speaking before the panel, Michael Scharf.217 Professor
Scharf spoke evenly of the gains made by the U.S. delegation and the
numerous compromises attempted by the conference.2 8 In the end,
2'5 "But in the end, there were a few very fundamental issues which either have to
be accommodated within the treaty text or they present very severe difficulties for
the United States government. And that is exactly what happened. Those accom-
modations were not achieved in the negotiations, and therefore we were not in a
position to support the text as it came out of Rome. That's disappointing. It's not
the end of the world. There's obviously a period of time now before entry into
force of this treaty that will offer various opportunities for dealing with the
outcome of the Rome conference, and we'll certainly be exploring those." On the
Record Briefing at Foreign Press Center, Federal Document Clearing House, Jul.
31, 1998, available in 1998 WL431804 (statement of David Scheffer, Ambassador-
At-Large Designate For War Crimes Issues) (emphasis added).
216 Hearing on the United Nations International Criminal Court, supra note 209.
Senator Helms added: "Mr. Ambassador, I commend you for voting "no" on this
fatally flawed treaty. But I must also be clear: Rejecting this treaty is not enough.
The United States must fight this treaty ... we must be aggressively opposed to this
Court." Id. Of course, one must question what exactly is being withheld. Given the
current U.S. obligations to the United Nations and the likelihood that Mr. Helms.
will continue to fight U.N. funding, it seems unlikely that the United States would
have supported the court, even if Mr. Scheffer's delegation had signed the statute.
217 Professor of Law and Director of the Center for International Law and Policy at
the New England School of Law. From 1989-1993, Professor Scharf served as the
Attorney-Adviser in the Office of the Legal Adviser of the U.S. Department of State
with responsibility for the issue of a permanent international criminal court, making
him Mr. Scheffer's predecessor in this venture.
218 See Michael P. Scharf, Prepared Remarks Before the International Operations
Subcommittee of the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (Jul. 23,
1998), available in 1998 WL 12762511 [hereinafter Scharf, Prepared Remarks].
The United States Delegation played hard ball in Rome and got just about
everything it wanted. These protections proved sufficient for other major
powers including the United Kingdom, France and Russia. But without what
would amount to an iron clad exemption for U.S. servicemen, the United
States felt compelled to force a vote, and ultimately to vote against the Court.
... I understand that the delegates loudly cheered for fifteen minutes when the
tally was announced. I'm told that a few of the members of the U.S. Delega-
tion had tears in their eyes.
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there was little more to say than that the United States must not miss
further opportunities to participate in the court.2 19 The reactions of the
more outspoken members of the subcommittee seem more grounded
in political rhetoric than in either established or desirable international
law, leaving the question open as to what exactly the United States
means by "Rule of Law" as an international policy objective.
G. What Harm is Done?
As of this writing, sixty-seven countries have signed the Rome
statute.220 The U.N. has set the date for the next conference, 2 which
will deal with the structure of the court.222 There is still much to do in
clarifying the financing of the court. 2 3 As no reservations were per-
mitted to the treaty,22 -and no amendments will be permitted before
seven years after the ICC's entry into force, 25 the statute as it stands
today will be the fundamental document upon which the institution
will be built. By opting out at this early stage, let alone establishing an
adversarial relationship with the rest of the world on this issue, the
219 See id.
In the final analysis, the U.S. may have lost far more than it gained by voting
against the ICC Statute. After having won so many battles in Rome, it is not
clear why the U.S. Delegation did not declare victory and vote in favor of the
Court (though ratification may have had to await a more favorable political
climate). There's still time for a change of heart. After all, it took the United
States over thirty years to ratify the 1948 Genocide Convention. But we fi-
nally did the right thing.
Id.
220 For a complete list of countries which have signed the statute, see the CICC's
Rome Statute Signature and Ratification Chart, (last modified Dec. 3, 1998)
<http://www.igc.org/icc/rome/html/ratify.html>.
22' The next conference is tentatively set for March, 1999.
222 By resolution F adopted at the Rome Conference, a preparatory commission must
take all possible measures to ensure the coming into operation of the Court, without
undue delay, and to make the necessary arrangements for the commencement of its
functions. (e.g., preparation of rules of procedure and evidence, elements of crimes,
a relationship agreement between the Court and the United Nations, and basic prin-
ciples governing a headquarters agreement). The draft texts of the rules of procedure
and evidence and of the elements of crimes must be finalized before June 30, 2000.
2 The statute provides that costs will be borne by the states' parties and the court,
but details and proportions were left unresolved. See Rome Statute, supra note 5, at
art. 100.
22A See id. at art. 120 ("Reservations").
225 See id. at art. 121 ("Amendments").
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United States preempted its own participation in the critical negotia-
tions which will shape the early days of the court. 2 6 The mechanisms
for inter-nation state cooperation, the procedure of the court, and,
most importantly, the world consensus on the crime of aggression will
presumably be negotiated without the guidance and grounding of the
United States.
227
Further, if the term "Rule of Law" means anything, it means that
all are equally bound and protected by law. The implicit reciprocity of
this concept is apparently lost on the State Department and those in
Congress, who would rather reserve the right to protect U.S. interests
directly via unilateral action than to rely on the world legal commu-
nity. The message this conveys to the rest of the world cuts both
ways- both to our fellow states and to the individuals within them.228
Clearly U.S. foreign policy has changed since World War H. By
failing to promote a binding international Rule of Law now, the
United States appears to the world to be intent on breaking its ties
with Nuremberg - a body of its own creation and, at least at one
See Scharf, Prepared Remarks, supra note 218.
Within five years the world will have a permanent international criminal court
even without U.S. support. As a non-party, the U.S. will not be bound to co-
operate with the Court. But this does not guarantee complete immunity from
the Court. It is important to understand that U.S. citizens, soldiers, and offi-
cials could still be indicted by the Court and even arrested and surrendered to
the Court while they are visiting a foreign country which happens to be a
party to the Court's Statute. Moreover, by failing to sign the Statute, the U.S.
will be prevented from participating in the preparatory committee which will
draft the Court's Rules of Procedure and further define the elements of the
crimes within the Court's jurisdiction.
Id.
227 See id.
[B]y failing to sign the Statute, the U.S. will be prevented from nominating a
candidate for the Court's bench, participating in the selection of the Court's
Prosecutor and judges, or voting on its funding. The most important question,
which cannot be answered at this time, is whether the adverse diplomatic fall-
out from the United States' action in Rome will ultimately prevent it from be-
ing able to utilize the first track of the Court's jurisdiction: that is, Security
Council referral of cases.
Id.
m "The U.S. action may be viewed as evidence that the world's greatest power does
not support the international effort to bring such persons to justice. A future Adolf
Hitler may point to the U.S. action in telling his followers that they need not fear
being held accountable." Id.
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time, reflective of its view of world justice. Yet, as reflected in the
actions of forward-looking nations at Rome, it does not appear that
the concept of an international Rule of Law as envisioned by Justice
Jackson has changed in the minds of the rest of the world during this
period. Moreover, members of the U.S. judiciary, the executive
branch, and the legislature have all stated the fundamental wisdom of
a such a rule - that, in order for true global peace and prosperity to
exist, the nations and individuals of the world must adhere to a bind-
ing and universally applicable code of legal behavior. Throughout the
latter half of this century, this concept has time and again trumped
questions of basic political sovereignty.
VI. EPILOGUE - BREAKING WITH OUR PAST
AND FORGETING A HEROIC VISION OF THE WORLD
Robert Jackson's heroic vision of a better world was imple-
mented in the Nuremberg charter and judgment. Jackson knew what
had to be done to create a world where a Rule of Law based on new
concepts of international justice would prevail. He knew that justice
had to be universal for it to be effective and that Nuremberg had to be
institutionalized for its precepts to last.
Jackson saw that the key to a better world was individual respon-
sibility - even on the very highest levels. He knew that for interna-
tional law to be effective it must impact the obligations of individuals
and their behavior. Jackson also asserted for the first time in any
court-that individuals had international human rights which could
not be limited by state action.
In Jackson's view, the supreme international crime was aggres-
sive war. He saw this as crucial to the long-term significance of Nur-
emberg. The institutionalizing of punishment for this and the other
core crimes would for Jackson - had he lived - been critical.
Most of the world has moved forward since Nuremberg and,
through the Rome Statute, has given a ringing endorsement to the
concepts expressed so eloquently by Jackson at Nuremberg. But, the
United States - like Iraq and Libya - has rejected the Rome Statute
and in so doing has signaled a desire to move backward to the anar-
chic world of pre-Nuremberg - where the nation state remains su-
preme and there is no permanent institution in place concerned with
the enforcement of rules designed to punish and prevent Nuremberg-
type crimes. If Nuremberg was the most impressive moral advance
emanating out of World War II, it is indeed a great tragedy that the
United States has now turned its back on its achievements there.
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FROM NUREMBERG TO ROME
To its discredit, the United States has backed away from Robert
Jackson's vision of a world at peace, and has reserved its right to
withhold itself and its citizens from the international Rule of Law. By
breaking away now, the court, and indeed the concept of an Interna-
tional Rule of Law, will grow without us. Military and economic
might aside, the conference at Rome proved that, in the post-cold war
era, the United States cannot demand that the rest of the world accord
it special treatment. Therefore, in the decades to come, the United
States will be faced with a critical question - are the doctrines of
universal jurisdiction and individual and State responsibility compati-
ble with U.S. foreign policy? If so, how will we, as a nation and great
power of the world, re-integrate ourselves into the community of for-
ward-looking nations, and, more importantly, do they really need us
as badly as we suppose?229 This begs the ultimate question of whether
the United States will ever achieve an ideological shift in its concept
of sovereignty, preparing to live in a cooperative world fundamentally
at peace - as opposed to a world which is simply between wars.
Hopefully, in time, the United States will remember the wisdom
of the Nuremberg principles, working to implement them by enacting
a permanent and viable International Criminal Court. When that oc-
curs - we shall know that the voice of reason so brilliantly reflected
m Ambassador Scheffer continues to believe so. While affirming that the United
States would not sign the treaty in its current form, he plainly believes the United
States will continue to participate in future discussions regarding the Court. In Oc-
tober he stated before the U.N. General Assembly that the "United States preferred a
policy of positive and forward-looking engagement in the hope of ensuring a treaty
that would stand for values and goals common to all." Press Release: GA/LJ3077
(Oct. 21 1998). Meanwhile, Senator Helms is hard at work against the court, using
his power on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to insert boilerplate language
into a number of recent treaty ratifications which opposes the court. See, e.g., Reso-
lution of Ratification of Treaties (including ratification of WIPO, numerous treaties
for "Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters," and a number of extradition
agreements, all presented in series) which include the following text as an "under-
standing," implicit in the ratification of the treaties:
"PROHIBITION ON ASSISTANCE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMI-
NAL COURT.-The United States shall exercise its rights to limit the use of
assistance it provides under the Treaty so that any assistance provided by the
Government of the United States shall not be transferred to or otherwise used
to assist the International Criminal Court agreed to in Rome, Italy, on July 17,
1998, unless the treaty establishing the court has entered into force for the
United States by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, as required by
Article II, section 2 of the United States Constitution."
144 CoNG.REc. S12985 (daily ed. Nov. 12, 1998).
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in Jackson's opening statement at Nuremberg has not been perma-
nently silenced in the shaping of U.S. foreign policy, but has again
been heard.
